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ABSTRACT 
States continue to abuse human rights and commit mass 
atrocities even though for the past several decades they have 
overwhelmingly ratified a host of international human rights 
treaties.  This Article seeks to explain this phenomenon and 
suggests that where treaty enforcement mechanisms are too weak 
for states to view them as a credible threat to their sovereignty, 
even states with the worst practices will regularly and readily 
commit to treaties designed to promote better human rights 
practices.  I empirically test my credible threat theory against the 
explanatory power of other extant theories about treaty 
commitment by examining the relationship between treaty 
enforcement mechanisms and likelihood of ratification across a 
broad range of treaties.  I include in my analysis the treaty creating 
the International Criminal Court (“ICC”)—a treaty which contains 
a strong enforcement mechanism in the form of an independent 
Prosecutor and the Court, which can punish violators. 
The results of the statistical tests using data from 1966 to 2008 
provide support for the credible threat theory.  I find that a state’s 
human rights ratings do not influence ratification of international 
human rights treaties with the weakest enforcement mechanisms, 
such as those that only require the state to self-report its 
compliance.  However, states with poorer records are significantly 
less likely to commit to the ICC treaty.  The implication is that 
where enforcement mechanisms are strong, states may take their 
commitment more seriously and join only if they intend to comply.  
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If we structure treaties with stronger enforcement mechanisms, 
perhaps fewer states will ratify, but at least when they do, they 
may be held to that commitment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Motivated by the destruction caused by World War II, the 
international community created a human rights regime designed 
to protect the basic human rights of all individuals.1  The 
international treaties at the foundation of this regime are the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (“ICESCR”), both of which were opened for signature and 
ratification in 1966 and came into force in 1976.2  Additional 
international human rights treaties followed, and the regime now 
boasts six primary treaties, to which the great majority of states 














                                                     
1 See YOUCEF BOUANDEL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS 1 (1997) 
(noting the increased focus on human rights following World War II); Thomas 
Buergenthal, The Normative and Institutional Evolution of International Human Rights, 
19 HUM. RTS. Q. 703, 706 (1997) (observing that World War II influenced the 
United Nations’ role in protecting individual’s rights); James Raymond Vreeland, 
Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture, 62 INT’L ORG. 65, 71 (2008) (noting the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment as one of World War II’s legacies).  
2 See Buergenthal, supra note 1, at 705 (discussing the evolution of 
international human rights, with the first stage of the evolution lasting from the 
entry into force of the United Nations Charter through the 1966 adoption of 
International Covenants on Human Rights). 
3 Treaty texts and information about their status is on file with the Secretary 
General of the United Nations at the United Nations Treaty Collection.  See 
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Chapter IV: Human Rights, 
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION [hereinafter U.N. Human Rights Treaties], 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en (last visited 
Nov. 18, 2012) (regarding the core human rights treaties). 
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Rights Protected Parties4 
International Covenant 
on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) 
1966 Life, Liberty, Freedom 




on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 




on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) 
1966 Fundamental and 
Human Rights for 
Persons of All Races 
173 
Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) 
1980 Fundamental and 





Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT) 
1984 Freedom from Torture 
and Other Forms of 
Punishment 
147 
Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC) 
1989 Fundamental and 




One might think states would only join5 treaties embodying 
principles they believe in and with goals they intend to further.  
But, is this true in the context of international human rights 
treaties?  Does the fact that the majority of states have 
overwhelmingly committed to this international human rights 
regime mean that most states are also committed to protecting 
human rights and ensuring that those who abuse human rights are 
brought to justice?  Or does something else explain the tendency of 
states to willingly commit to a regime which, at least on paper, 
purports to infringe on state sovereignty by requiring the state to 
conduct its domestic affairs in a way that will not run afoul of 
                                                     
4 States parties are listed as of August 2010.   
5 I use the words “join” or “commit” to refer to a state’s decision to ratify an 
international human rights treaty. 
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treaty requirements without offering any tangible benefits 
according to treaty terms? 
Although various theories have been advanced to explain state 
commitment to human rights treaties, some evidence suggests 
states join international human rights treaties somewhat 
indiscriminately and perhaps as window dressing only.6  Because 
many international human rights treaties have nonexistent or weak 
enforcement mechanisms—often only requiring that states self-
report compliance—states may view commitment as essentially 
costless from a sovereignty standpoint.7  In fact, scholars have 
                                                     
6 See, e.g., Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a 
Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 AM. J.  SOC. 1373, 1374 (2005) 
(suggesting that states may ratify human rights treaties only for window dressing 
purposes, given that the average state has ratified a steadily increasing number of 
human rights treaties but the percentage of states reportedly repressing human 
rights has grown over time); Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. 1821, 1856–58 (2003) [hereinafter Hathaway, Cost of Commitment] (finding 
that non-democratic states with poor human rights ratings are just as likely, and 
sometimes even more likely, to commit to international human rights treaties than 
non-democratic states with better human rights ratings); Oona A. Hathaway, Do 
Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1982–87 (2002) 
[hereinafter Hathaway, Make a Difference?] (showing, for example, that 
approximately the same percentage of countries with the most recorded acts of 
torture ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment as did countries with no recorded acts of 
torture).  
7 For example, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, states agree to submit reports on the measures they have taken to give 
effect to the Covenant’s provisions.  International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, art. 40, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (“The States 
Parties . . . undertake to submit reports on the measures they have adopted which 
give effect to the rights recognized . . . .”).  The texts of the five other core 
international human rights treaties similarly provide that states self-report 
compliance.  See Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 44, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 44 [hereinafter CRC] (“States Parties undertake to submit to the 
Committee, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, reports on the 
measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein and 
on the progress made on the enjoyment of those rights . . . .”); Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 
19, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113 [hereinafter CAT] (“The States Parties shall 
submit to the Committee, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
reports on the measures they have taken to give effect to their undertakings under 
this Convention, within one year after the entry into force of the Convention for 
the State Party concerned.”); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, arts. 18, 21, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14 
[hereinafter CEDAW] (requesting States Parties to submit reports for 
consideration by the CEDAW Committee, and instructing the CEDAW 
Committee to “make suggestions and general recommendations based on the 
examination of reports and information received from the States Parties”); 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, arts. 16, 17, Dec. 
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found that past and present practices (presumably indicators of the 
state’s commitment to, and ability to comply with, the principles 
embodied by treaties promoting good human rights practices) are 
not real indicators of whether a state will join an international 
treaty protecting human rights.  Rather, some studies have found 
that states with poor human rights records are often just as likely 
to commit as are states with good records.8  Furthermore, studies 
have shown that many states continue their poor practices despite 
the fact that they have ratified a treaty condemning such practices.9 
Recently, however, the international community created an 
international human rights treaty with a stronger enforcement 
mechanism designed to induce compliance with treaty terms.  In 
July 1998, states adopted the Rome Statute and created the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”).10  The ICC is the first 
permanent, treaty-based international criminal court established to 
help end impunity for perpetrators of the most serious crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.11  Unlike 
previous treaties, the ICC treaty contains significant, legally 
binding, and precise enforcement mechanisms.  First, by 
                                                                                                                        
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] (enumerating the procedures states 
must follow when submitting “reports on the measures which they have adopted 
and the progress made in achieving the observance of the rights recognized” in 
the Covenant); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, art. 9, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 212 [hereinafter CERD] (requiring 
states to submit “a report on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other 
measures which they have adopted and which give effect to the provisions of this 
Convention”). 
8 See Hathaway, Make a Difference?, supra note 6, at 1982 (“[C]ountries with 
the worst Genocide ratings are just about as likely as those with the best to have 
ratified the Genocide Convention.”); Hathaway, Cost of Commitment, supra note 6, 
at 1856 (finding empirical evidence to support the proposition that “countries 
with better human rights ratings are apparently more reluctant to commit to 
human rights treaties than otherwise expected and countries with poor ratings are 
less reluctant to do so than otherwise expected”). 
9 See Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, supra note 6, at 1378 (“As external pressures 
decrease, governments often spiral into worse repression after ratification, and the 
human rights legal regime remains powerless to stop this process.”). 
10 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
11 See id. pmbl. paras. 4–5, arts. 5–8.  Beginning after January 1, 2017, and 
assuming the parties to the Rome Statute vote to amend the statute accordingly, 
the ICC will also have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.  See Review 
Conference of the Rome Statute, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression, Resolution RC/Res.6, Annex I, ¶¶ 2, 3(3) 
(June 11, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC           
-Res.6-ENG.pdf. 
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committing to the ICC, states agree that the Court has automatic 
jurisdiction over those core crimes.12  States also agree that an 
independent ICC Prosecutor may initiate investigations against the 
state’s nationals for the covered crimes either on his own with the 
approval of the Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber, or based on referrals 
from a State Party or the United Nations Security Council.13  
However, both the Prosecutor and the Court operate without 
direct United Nations Security Council oversight, and the Council 
has no power to veto decisions to investigate particular 
situations.14  In addition, the ICC has jurisdiction to prosecute even 
heads of state and does not recognize any immunity states may 
have otherwise granted to such actors who engage in criminal 
activity that falls within the Court’s jurisdiction.15 
Finally, although it is true that the ICC operates as a court of 
last resort, under the “complementary” provision of the Rome 
Statute, the ICC will obtain jurisdiction over the nationals of States 
Parties where the state is “unwilling or unable genuinely” to 
proceed with a case.16  “Unwillingness” includes instances where 
national proceedings are a sham or are inconsistent with an 
intention to bring the person to justice, either because such 
proceedings are unjustifiably delayed or are not conducted 
independently or impartially.17  A nation’s “inability” to prosecute 
includes instances where, because of the collapse or unavailability 
                                                     
12 See Rome Statute, supra note 9, arts. 5–8, 11, 12(2) (listing the crimes and 
explaining the Court’s jurisdiction). 
13 See id. arts. 13–15. 
14 See Lionel Yee, The International Criminal Court and The Security Council: 
Articles 13(b) and 16, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE 
ROME STATUTE 143–52 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (explaining that the objective of article 
13(b) of the Rome Statute is to avoid a special tribunal or oversight by the Security 
Council).  See also Jack Goldsmith & Stephen D. Krasner, The Limits of Idealism, 
DAEDALUS, Winter 2003, at 47, 53 (“[T]he ICC prosecutor and court are 
unaccountable to any democratic institution or elected official.”); Christopher 
Rudolph, Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals, 55 
INT’L ORG. 655, 679–80 (2001) (explaining that Article 16 of the Rome Statute does 
not give single members of the Security Council veto power, but rather only 
defers prosecution through a unanimous vote of the Security Council). 
15 Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 27. 
16 Id. pmbl. para. 10, art. 17(1)(a). 
17 Id. art. 17(2) (stating that in determining “unwillingness,” the Court shall 
consider whether “(a) [t]he proceedings were or are being undertaken . . . for the 
purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility . . . ; (b) 
[t]here has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings . . . ; [and] (c) [t]he 
proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially . . . 
.”). 
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of its national judicial system, the nation cannot obtain the accused 
or the necessary evidence, or is otherwise unable to carry out the 
proceedings.18  The Court—as opposed to States Parties to the 
Rome Statute—determines whether the “unwilling or unable” 
bases for proceeding before the ICC have been met, thus further 
demonstrating the strength and independence of the ICC’s 
enforcement mechanisms. 
The existence of the ICC treaty offers an excellent opportunity 
to test whether and how the design of international human rights 
treaties influences state commitment decisions.  Building on the 
logic advanced by Oona Hathaway,19 I argue that state 
commitment to international human rights treaties is a function of 
two considerations relative to the costs of failing to comply with 
treaty terms: (1) the institutional design of the treaty—specifically, 
the strength of its enforcement mechanisms—and (2) the state’s 
level of domestic human rights practices.  States should be more 
likely to ratify a given treaty if (1) the treaty’s enforcement 
mechanisms are weak (such that compliance with treaty terms may 
be irrelevant) or (2) the treaty’s enforcement mechanisms are 
relatively strong, but the state’s recent past and present human 
rights practices indicate that it can comply with treaty terms.  Thus, 
empirically we should still see that states with bad human rights 
practices20 will regularly and readily commit to treaties with weak 
enforcement mechanisms.  However, states should view stronger 
enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat and commit only if 
                                                     
18 Id. art. 17(3) (the Court will find “inability” where, “due to a total or 
substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is 
unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or 
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings”). 
19 The present study goes beyond Hathaway’s 2003 examination of state 
commitment to international human rights treaties.  Hathaway purposely studied 
ratification of only four different treaties using two independent variables of 
interest—namely, a state’s human rights ratings and whether or not it was a 
democracy—without accounting for the timing of ratifications.  See Hathaway, 
Cost of Commitment, supra note 6, at 1849 (arguing that democratic countries are 
more likely to join human rights treaties than nondemocratic countries.).  In a later 
study, Hathaway included additional variables testing commitment to several 
human rights treaties using a Cox proportional hazards model, though her study 
did not include the ICC.  See Oona A. Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to 
Human Rights Treaties?, 51 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 588, 592 (2007) (maintaining that the 
effect of human rights treaties on states depends on the treaties’ domestic 
enforcement and collateral consequences). 
20 In the empirical tests, I use a state’s human rights ratings as a proxy for its 
human rights practices.  See infra Section 5.3 (measuring and comparing the 
human rights practices of various states).  
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the state’s rational calculations concerning the strength of its 
domestic human rights practices indicate that it should be able to 
comply with treaty terms and thereby avoid costly infringements 
on its sovereignty. 
This Article offers the first empirical analysis of the relationship 
between treaty enforcement mechanisms and likelihood of 
ratification across a broad range of treaties.  I test the credible 
threat theory in the context of the six main international human 
rights treaties and their associated articles and optional protocols, 
as well as the ICC treaty.  I categorize the resulting fourteen treaty 
commitment possibilities according to five different levels of 
enforcement mechanisms, which range from self-reporting to the 
ICC treaty’s independent Prosecutor and Court.21  Although the 
empirical results cannot be conclusive, they do provide support for 
the explanatory power of the credible threat theory.  The results of 
event history analysis from 1966 to 2008 indicate that states with 
poorer human rights ratings more regularly commit to 
international human rights treaties with the weakest enforcement 
mechanisms.  However, states with poor ratings are less likely to 
commit to the ICC, suggesting that states view those stronger 
enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat and are more likely to 
commit if they can comply with treaty terms.  This further suggests 
that states with poor human rights practices may not join 
international human rights treaties because they do not want to be 
held accountable for respecting and protecting the lives of their 
citizenry.  Rather, at least some states may ratify these treaties only 
because commitment costs are cheap and the consequences of 
noncompliance are trivial.  On the other hand, where enforcement 
                                                     
21 As discussed in Section 4.2, some of the international human rights treaties 
included within this study have optional articles whereby states can agree to 
additional enforcement measures.  For example, states may recognize the 
competence of a committee to consider complaints of one state against another 
claiming the party is not fulfilling its obligations under the treaty.  See, e.g., 
ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 41(1) (“A State Party to the present Covenant may at any 
time declare under this article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee 
to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that 
another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the present Covenant.”).  
States may also recognize the competence of a committee to hear complaints by 
individuals alleging the state has violated treaty terms.  See, e.g., CAT, supra note 
6, art. 22(1) (“A State Party to this Convention may at any time declare . . . that it 
recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider 
communications from or on behalf of individuals subject to its jurisdiction who 
claim to be victims of a violation by a State Party of the provisions of the 
Convention.”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
01 DUTTON (DO NOT DELETE) 1/18/2013  5:10 PM 
10 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 34:1 
mechanisms are relatively strong, the statistical evidence indicates 
that calculations about the costs of commitment significantly 
influence state ratification behavior. 
This Article is organized into six sections.  Section 2 provides a 
brief overview of the international human rights regime.  Section 3 
follows with a review of the existing literature explaining state 
commitment to international human rights treaties.  In Section 4, I 
discuss more fully my theory about the credible threat associated 
with stronger enforcement mechanisms and how that threat 
influences state ratification behavior.  I also explain how I 
categorize the various treaties included in this study according to 
five different levels of enforcement mechanisms.  In Section 5, I 
describe the research design of the empirical analysis.  Section 6 
presents the results of the statistical tests.  The conclusion in 
Section 7 addresses implications of the empirical results and 
outlines avenues for future research. 
2. THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME 
The international human rights regime is a relatively new 
creation.  Only following World War II, and essentially motivated 
by the destruction caused by that war, did the international 
community focus on creating a systematic regime designed to 
protect the basic human rights of all individuals.22  Those basic 
human rights were defined in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (“UDHR”), adopted in 1948 by the United Nations General 
Assembly.23  The UDHR expressed an idea that was revolutionary 
                                                     
22 See BOUANDEL, supra note 1 (analyzing the evolution of international 
human rights regimes since the Second World War); BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 23 (2009) (detailing 
the systematic process behind drafting declarations on human rights); 
Buergenthal, supra note 1, at 705 (discussing the rise of human rights instruments, 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the immediate aftermath of 
World War II); Wade M. Cole, Sovereignty Relinquished?  Explaining Commitment to 
the International Human Rights Covenants, 1966–1999, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 472, 474–75 
(2005) (relating the systematic nature of modern human rights protocols); 
Vreeland, supra note 1, at 71 (asserting that numerous human rights conventions, 
including the Convention Against Torture, arose from the legacy of World War 
II); Christine Min Wotipka & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Global Human Rights and State 
Sovereignty: State Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1965–2001, 23 
SOC. F. 724, 729 (2008) (claiming that the devastation of World War II provided an 
impetus for the U.N. and its member states to seek to protect universal rights, 
which until then had not been a pronounced or unified international goal). 
23 See Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40 INT’L 
ORG. 599, 606 (1986) (discussing the enunciation of civil, political, economic, 
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at the time: human rights were universal in character, and the 
international community had an obligation to ensure those rights 
were protected without regard to international boundaries or 
states’ sovereign rights.24  Although the UDHR was only a 
declaratory document and not binding on states, it paved the way 
for numerous international institutions designed to promote and 
protect human rights. 
As noted above, the ICCPR and the ICESCR—initially drafted 
in 1954—are the foundation of the international human rights 
regime.  Additional binding treaties followed the drafting of the 
two Covenants.  For example, the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”) 
entered into force in 1969.  The Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(“CAT”) was adopted in December 1984 and entered into force in 
1987 when the required number of states had ratified the treaty.  
The international human rights regime also expanded to include 
institutions aimed at protecting particular groups from systematic 
discrimination.  Although Article 3 of the ICCPR prohibited 
discrimination against women, in 1979, the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted a comprehensive treaty designed to promote 
the equal rights for women and the protection of women against 
all forms of discrimination.  That treaty—the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(“CEDAW”)—was opened for signature in 1980 and entered into 
force in 1981.  The Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) 
entered into force in 1990.25 
Binding international treaties constitute the foundation and 
principle substance of the international human rights regime, the 
idea being that the binding nature of these international 
institutions can make them a strong and effective instrument to 
promote and protect global human rights.  International human 
rights treaties are adopted and opened for signature by the United 
Nations General Assembly and require signatures and ratifications 
                                                                                                                        
social, and cultural rights in the UDHR); Vreeland, supra note 1, at 71 (positing 
that the content of “human rights” was principally advanced through the UDHR). 
24 Wotipka & Tsutsui, supra note 21, at 729–30 (maintaining that the UDHR 
and the Charter of the United Nations were the first “concerted efforts” to protect 
universal human rights, and that the ideas contained in the UDHR were 
“revolutionary in international relations and international law” for their intended 
universal application). 
25 See U.N. Human Rights Treaties, supra note 3. 
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by a particular number of countries in order to enter into force.  
Only by ratifying or acceding to the treaty (which is the process 
states use where they have not previously signed the treaty) are 
states legally bound by treaty terms.  Furthermore, a government’s 
ability to ratify a treaty depends on its own domestic rules 
regarding ratification: some governments may bind their states to 
treaties based only on the will of a chief executive while others 
need the approval of a significant vote of a legislative body or 
bodies.  Finally, until they enter into force, treaties have no binding 
effect on governments. 
These international human rights treaties usually have some 
enforcement mechanism that is ostensibly designed to hold states 
accountable to their treaty commitments.  In the international 
human rights context, that enforcement mechanism is most 
typically under the control of a committee of experts established 
pursuant to the text of the treaty.  Although terms differ, most 
treaties provide for a committee to monitor state compliance by 
examining reports that states are required to submit commenting 
on their own human rights practices.  Committees reviewing these 
reports can typically question states about them and also make 
comments about the state’s level of treaty compliance.  However, 
the committees have no power to order sanctions or otherwise 
punish states for their failure to live up to treaty terms.  Thus, 
states that file even the most perfunctory of reports likely have 
sufficiently complied with treaty terms.26 
Some treaties and protocols, however, allow states to bind 
themselves to additional committee oversight of their practices.  
States can agree on the committee’s competence to hear complaints 
by other states claiming that they are not living up to their 
obligations under the treaty.27  Some treaties further allow states to 
agree on the committee’s competence to hear complaints by 
individuals alleging that their rights under the treaty have been 
violated—if the individuals have, among other things, exhausted 
                                                     
26 JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 85 (3d ed. 2007) (noting 
both the benefits and shortcomings of the reporting procedure of the ICCPR’s 
Human Rights Committee). 
27 See CAT, supra note 6, art. 21 (“A State Party to this Convention may at any 
time declare under this article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee 
to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that 
another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under this Convention.”); 
ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 41 (similar). 
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available domestic remedies.28  Finally, some treaties provide that 
states can recognize the competence of the committee to visit their 
territory and grant the committee access to relevant information 
about potential violations of the rights protected by the treaty.29  In 
each of these cases, the state binds itself to increasingly greater 
impositions on its sovereign rights to regulate domestic affairs.  In 
addition, if a state cannot be persuaded to comply with the 
committee’s recommendations regarding complaints or other 
violations uncovered during any investigations, the committee can 
issue reports about the state’s non-compliance and possibly also 
make a public statement on the matter.30  However, the committees 
have “no authority to act punitively against the offending state, or 
impose any sanctions” for noncompliance.31 
In recent years, however, the scope of the international human 
rights regime has broadened.  Until the 1990s, most treaties had as 
their primary focus holding governments, as opposed to 
individuals, accountable for ensuring the protection of human 
rights within their states, not only by promoting good human 
rights standards, but also by punishing those who violated the 
                                                     
28 By committing to the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, states may 
agree that individuals can bring complaints against them alleging violations of the 
ICCPR.  See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, art. 1, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter ICCPR First Optional 
Protocol].  Similar provisions are contained in Article 14 of the CERD, supra note 
6; Article 22 of the CAT, supra note 6; and in the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW.  
See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, art. 2, Oct. 6, 1999, 2131 U.N.T.S. 83, 97 
[hereinafter CEDAW Optional Protocol]. 
29 In committing to the Optional Protocol to the CAT, a state recognizes the 
competence of the Subcommittee on Prevention to regularly visit any place under 
the state’s jurisdiction and control where persons are held in detention by the 
government or with its acquiescence.  See Optional Protocol to Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, arts. 4, 11, Dec. 18, 2002, 2375 U.N.T.S 237 [hereinafter CAT Optional 
Protocol]. 
30 See ICCPR First Optional Protocol, supra note 27, arts. 5, 6 (establishing the 
Human Rights Committee’s procedural guidelines following submission of an 
individual communication, including summarizing its activity in its annual 
report); CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 27, arts. 7, 12 (similar, with regard 
to the CEDAW Committee). 
31 Henry J. Steiner, Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What Role 
for the Human Rights Committee?, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY 
MONITORING 15, 36–37 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000). 
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standards imposed.32  Recognizing that some governments either 
were the rights violators or were essentially powerless to protect 
their citizenry from the abuses meted out by some groups or 
criminal organizations, the international community actively 
turned towards creating an institution that would help to end 
impunity for mass atrocities where states themselves were either 
unwilling or unable to do so.  In this regard, and after many years 
of negotiations, in July 1998 during a United Nations conference in 
Rome, states adopted a treaty—the Rome Statute—creating the 
International Criminal Court.33  In July 2002 after the required sixty 
states had ratified the Rome Statute, the ICC came into existence.34  
States committing to the ICC treaty agree to cede to an 
independent Prosecutor the power to prosecute the state’s own 
nationals for mass atrocities should the Prosecutor and the ICC’s 
Pre-Trial Chamber determine the state is unwilling or unable to do 
so domestically. 
3. EXISTING LITERATURE ON STATE COMMITMENT TO 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 
A number of scholars have offered theories to explain why 
states might decide to ratify treaties designed to hold the state to 
domestically promoting and protecting human rights.  I group that 
literature under the following two labels: (1) the “rationalist view” 
and (2) the “external pressures view.”  Within the “rationalist 
view,” I include theories that focus primarily on the direct costs 
and benefits of treaty commitment.  Under this view, states will 
commit to treaties where the costs of commitment are low, where 
compliance is otherwise not costly because the state can comply 
with treaty terms, or where commitment costs are outweighed by 
specific domestic benefits the state may derive by binding itself to 
the treaty’s terms.  Under the “external pressures view,” I include 
theories that look beyond direct cost and benefit calculations to 
explain treaty commitment.  For example, even where a state 
                                                     
32 See Buergenthal, supra note 1, at 717–20 (discussing the expanded the 
concept of international responsibility for violations of human rights, which now 
includes individuals and groups in addition to governments). 
33 See Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 22, 23 (1999) (outlining the negotiation process which 
culminated in the Rome Conference). 
34 See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT (3d ed. 2007) (describing the origins, initial rulings, and 
functioning of the International Criminal Court). 
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cannot comply with treaty terms, it may be persuaded that 
ratifying treaties embracing positive norms may be the appropriate 
thing to do if the state wants to be viewed as a legitimate player on 
the world stage and one worthy of obtaining extra-treaty benefits, 
such as aid and trade.35  Richer and more powerful states may also 
pressure other weaker states to join international human rights 
treaties by threatening to withhold extra-treaty benefits if the state 
does not at least signal its intention to abide by international norms 
calling for states to domestically protect against human rights 
abuses. 
3.1. The Rationalist View 
Under a rationalist view, states will consider their own material 
interests and only join treaties where the costs of commitment are 
small or outweighed by benefits that can be derived from that 
commitment.36  States may calculate those costs, however, in more 
or less retrospective or prospective ways.  States may look to their 
past practices and actions as a guide to determining whether treaty 
commitment is likely to be relatively costless even if enforcement 
mechanisms are strong.  On the other hand, even if a state’s past 
and present human rights practices suggest that compliance with 
treaty terms may be difficult, a state’s commitment decisions may 
be guided by rational calculations about whether binding itself to 
the treaty’s terms can provide overriding future benefits. 
3.1.1.  Rationalist and Retrospective Calculations 
3.1.1.1.  Domestic Practice and Policy Compliance Costs 
For example, scholars advancing a rationalist view of state 
ratification behavior suggest that states will avoid costly 
commitments and be more likely to join treaties with which they 
can easily comply and which will impose few, if any, limitations on 
their sovereignty.  Indeed, George Downs, David Rocke, and Peter 
                                                     
35 See, e.g., JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: 
THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 160–62 (1989) (discussing political 
institutions and how they function, how they affect political life, how they change, 
and how they might be improved). 
36 See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International 
Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1860 (2002) (suggesting that the rationalist view of state 
behavior provides predictions about how countries will act inasmuch as it 
assumes that states weigh the costs and benefits of their actions and proceed 
where benefits outweigh costs). 
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Barsoom argue that the primary reason we may see widespread 
compliance with many treaties is because states have a tendency to 
join only those treaties that do not require them to depart from 
what they would have done in the absence of the treaty.37  In short, 
states will view compliance costs—and the concomitant loss to 
state sovereignty—as minimal and will tend to join treaties with 
which their past and present practices and policies are already 
consistent.38 
In the case of international human rights treaties, state 
calculations about policy similarity and compliance costs will 
likely center on the state’s domestic political configuration and its 
past and present human rights practices.  In fact, much literature 
suggests that democracies generally should be more likely than 
autocracies to commit to treaties requiring them to protect against 
human rights abuses.  After all, democratic states generally protect 
basic human rights, apply the rule of law fairly, and limit state 
power.  Therefore, for those states, ratification of human rights 
treaties should be essentially costless since commitment will 
produce little, if any, change to the status quo ante.39  For autocratic 
regimes, however, ratification may be quite costly.  Because 
autocratic regimes tend not to place legal restraints on their own 
power, commitment to international human rights treaties could 
require significant policy change in order to ensure the state does 
not run afoul of treaty terms, policies, and goals.40  Even aside from 
a state’s domestic political configuration, however, a state’s 
practices and policies regarding individual human rights should 
enter into rational compliance cost calculations.  States with a 
recent history of better human rights practices should find 
commitment less costly, and the risks to state sovereignty of 
noncompliance less significant, than states with a history of worse 
practices.41 
                                                     
37 George W. Downs, David M. Rocke & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the Good News 
about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 383 (1996) 
(explaining the major limitations on the inferences that can be drawn from the 
compliance evidence alone).   
38 Id. (emphasizing that states will rarely spend a great amount of time and 
effort in negotiating agreements that will continually be violated). 
39 See Cole, supra note 22, at 475–76.  
40 See id. (contrasting autocratic regimes with democracies). 
41 See id.; Wotipka & Tsutsui, supra note 22, at 737–38 (summarizing the 
hypothesis that correlates extant human rights practices and policies with the 
likelihood of treaty ratification). 
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Along these same lines, Christine Wotipka and Kiyoteru 
Tsutsui argue that compliance with human rights norms may be 
easier for wealthier and more developed countries since those 
countries may already have in place policies permitting ready 
compliance with most international human rights treaties.42  They 
note that economically developed countries tend to be more 
politically stable and also have citizens who embrace progress and 
post-materialist values—such as the need to protect citizens against 
human rights abuses.43  On the other hand, countries that are less 
economically developed may not be able to devote sufficient 
resources to ensuring that human rights are protected, particularly 
if the economic situation also leads to violence or political 
instability.  Those states may find that compliance with 
international human rights treaties would require a substantial 
commitment to policy change—a fact that may cause them to avoid 
ratifying. 
Finally, the costs of complying with international human rights 
treaties may be reduced even for states with practices and policies 
that do not conform to treaty terms where the mechanisms to 
enforce compliance are weak or nonexistent.44  To the extent that 
enforcement mechanisms are not strong enough to hold states to 
their commitment and punish bad and noncompliant behavior, 
even rights-abusing states may rationally conclude that 
commitment is warranted and also relatively costless. 
Indeed, some empirical evidence supports the notion that state 
commitment decisions are influenced at least in part by states’ 
                                                     
42 Wotipka & Tsutsui, supra note 22, at 737 (summarizing the hypothesis that 
a state’s likelihood of ratifying human rights treaties increases as the level of 
development and their citizens’ awareness of human rights increases). 
43 See generally RONALD INGLEHART, THE SILENT REVOLUTION: CHANGING 
VALUES AND POLITICAL STYLES AMONG WESTERN PUBLICS (1977) (analyzing the shift 
in value of Western publics from an emphasis on material well-being and physical 
security towards greater emphasis on the quality of life); RONALD INGLEHART, 
CULTURE SHIFT IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1990) (examining the changes in 
public opinion toward religious beliefs, motives for work, and various social 
issues, such as divorce and abortion). 
44 See Hathaway, Cost of Commitment, supra note 6, at 1832, 1834–36 
(observing that states with poor human rights practices, in some cases, ratify 
human rights treaties where the cost of complying with the treaty, as determined 
by the strength of its enforcement and monitoring mechanisms, are low).  Cf. 
Downs, Rocke, & Barsoom, supra note 36, at 383, 388–92 (finding that a treaty may 
have weak or nonexistent enforcement mechanisms where the terms of the treaty 
do not bind participant states to any more than that to which those states would 
have otherwise committed). 
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perceptions about the strength of the treaty’s enforcement 
mechanisms.  In her study examining state commitment to four 
different human rights treaties requiring only that states report 
their level of compliance, Oona Hathaway found that non-
democracies with poor human rights ratings were just as likely, 
and sometimes even more likely, than non-democracies with better 
human rights ratings to ratify.  Hathaway attributed this finding to 
the treaties’ weak enforcement mechanisms and also the absence of 
domestic enforcement mechanisms in the form of an active and 
vocal civil society or others who ordinarily push for better 
practices in democracies.45  On the other hand, my own statistical 
tests of ICC commitment using event history analysis showed that 
states with worse human rights practices and non-democracies 
were less likely to join the Court than were states with better 
practices.46  These findings suggest that where enforcement 
mechanisms are stronger—as they are in the ICC treaty—states 
will be more likely to ratify only where their compliance cost 
calculations suggest they can comply with treaty terms and avoid 
costly sovereignty losses. 
3.1.1.2.  Costs of Domestic Ratification Processes 
Beth Simmons identifies the political domestic ratification 
process as another cost that governments may calculate when 
deciding whether to commit to international treaties.47  In order to 
bind themselves to international treaties, states must follow 
                                                     
45 See Hathaway, Cost of Commitment, supra note 6, at 1856 (asserting that, 
because democratic states generally have “stronger internal enforcement 
mechanisms” than non-democratic states, democracies and non-democracies are 
likely to have disparate commitment patterns). 
46 See Yvonne M. Dutton, Explaining State Commitment to the International 
Criminal Court: Strong Enforcement Mechanisms as a Credible Threat, 10 WASH. U. 
GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 477, 482 (2011) (arguing that commitment to an international 
human rights treaty is a function of the strength of the treaty’s enforcement 
mechanism and of the strength of a state’s internal policies and enforcement 
mechanisms).  The results of event history analysis showed that a state’s level of 
human rights practices was a highly significant and positive predictor of ICC 
treaty ratification.  Id. at 520.  In fact, with each unit increase in a state’s human 
rights rating, the state became between 30% and 38% more likely to commit to the 
ICC.  Id.  The results also showed that democracies were more likely than non-
democracies to join the Court.  Id. at 521–23. 
47 See SIMMONS, supra note 22, at 68 (identifying as “legal integration costs” 
those costs that stem from executive-legislative relations, those that stem from the 
nature of the legal system itself, and those that stem from power-sharing in 
federal systems). 
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whatever domestic processes are required to make any ratification 
legal and legitimate.  The political costs associated with treaty 
ratification will be lowest, as Simmons notes, when the 
government fully controls the process, such as where the head of 
state has the sole right to make ratification decisions.48  States that 
must undertake a more onerous process, however, may find treaty 
ratification politically more costly.  Indeed, as in the United States, 
some states may require an affirmative supermajority vote of their 
legislature before the government is permitted to bind itself to an 
international treaty.  Where the number of domestic “legislative 
veto players” is larger, governments may face opposition to, or 
delays in, the treaty ratification process that can make ratifying an 
international human rights treaty too politically costly to pursue.49 
3.1.2.  Rationalist and Prospective Calculations 
3.1.2.1.  Future Domestic Uncertainty Costs 
By contrast to the rationalist theories discussed above, which 
emphasize the backward-looking calculations states may engage in 
when making commitment decisions, some rationalist theories 
instead focus on more prospective and forward-looking 
calculations.  For example, treaty ratification may cause some 
states—particularly those that follow a common law legal 
tradition—to incur future domestic uncertainty costs.50  In the 
common law tradition, as opposed to the civil law tradition, the 
judiciary is generally independent from the government and there 
is some possibility that it will apply treaty law in a way that creates 
                                                     
48 Id. (noting that in such instances, where the executive has sole prerogative 
both to negotiate and to ratify a treaty, “ratification follows virtually 
automatically from the signing of the text”).  
49 See id. at 68–69 (noting that the higher the number of legislative veto 
players in a state, the higher the “ratification hurdle” and the less the state is likely 
to ratify an international agreement). 
50 See id. at 71 (arguing that features typical to common law systems, 
including an emphasis on judge-made law and judicial independence, result in 
legal dualism and thus provide incentives for governments to take a slower 
approach to treaty ratification); see also Jay Goodliffe & Darren G. Hawkins, 
Explaining Commitment: States and the Convention Against Torture, 68 J. POL. 358, 364 
(2006) (explaining that judges in common law judicial systems may apply 
international treaties by drawing on legal sources beyond a statutory code, thus 
creating unintended commitment costs for states). 
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new government obligations to the state’s citizens and others.51  
Therefore, even for states with present practices and policies that 
would otherwise make compliance with treaty terms relatively 
costless, this future uncertainty about how treaty law will be 
applied after ratification may cause common law states to be wary 
of ratifying international human rights treaties. 
3.1.2.2.  Future Hand-Tying Benefits 
3.1.2.2.1.  Credible Commitment 
Other scholars suggest that states may rationally commit to 
certain international human rights treaties in order to obtain future 
hand-tying benefits—notwithstanding that their past and present 
domestic political configurations and prevailing human rights 
practices suggest an inability to comply with treaty terms.  In their 
study of state commitment to the ICC, Beth Simmons and Allison 
Danner argue that for non-democracies with poor human rights 
practices, the sovereignty costs of joining the Court are outweighed 
by the potential future benefits the state can obtain by binding 
itself to the ICC treaty’s strong enforcement mechanisms.52  
Specifically, by ratifying the ICC treaty, those autocratic states with 
poor human rights practices can credibly commit to their domestic 
audiences to end their past cycles of violence and, instead, respond 
non-violently to crises in the future.53 Simmons’ and Danner’s 
statistical results from event history analysis produce some 
support for their theory.  They find that states that have recently 
experienced mass atrocities and that have poor practices are likely 
to join the ICC as long as those states also have weak institutions of 
domestic accountability.54 
                                                     
51 SIMMONS, supra note 22, at 73–74 (“[A] greater range of interpretative 
possibilities from a highly independent judiciary makes it more difficult to know 
ex ante how any particular treaty will be interpreted.”). 
52 See Beth A. Simmons & Allison Danner, Credible Commitments and the 
International Criminal Court, 64 INT’L ORG. 225, 233–36 (2010) (noting that 
governments that face domestic turmoil and suffer from weak domestic 
enforcement mechanisms may commit to international treaties with strong 
enforcement provisions in order to credibly commit to a peaceable domestic 
agreement). 
53 Id. at 234 (“Joining the ICC greatly enhances the risk for states of future 
punishment of their senior leaders, at least by comparison to a regime of 
impunity.”). 
54 Id. at 252–53.  Though Simmons and Danner did find support for their 
theory, one can question whether they used the best measure for a state’s 
tendency to commit mass atrocities.  They measured this concept using data on 
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Nevertheless, I am more persuaded by the logic of the theories 
positing that states will be more backward-looking in calculating 
the costs of committing to international human rights treaties.  
According to those theories, states will commit only where their 
calculations indicate they can presently comply with treaty terms—
unless, of course, treaty enforcement mechanisms are so weak that 
bad and noncompliant behavior cannot be punished.  It is true that 
some states may decide to join the ICC despite their bad practices 
and so as to force themselves to be better in the future.  But, 
autocracies may not overwhelmingly decide to act in this manner.  
Rather, since autocratic regimes with bad practices have declined 
to limit their power domestically, those states may not be inclined 
to relinquish their sovereignty to an international institution that 
can punish them for practices they may not have made punishable 
domestically.  While such states may rationally conclude that 
committing to treaties with weak enforcement mechanisms is 
relatively costless, committing to an international institution with 
strong enforcement mechanisms that can punish bad and 
noncompliant behavior is another matter.  Indeed, Hathaway’s 
study showed that autocratic states with bad human rights 
practices regularly commit to international human rights treaties 
with very weak enforcement mechanisms—mechanisms that 
would not enable them to signal to their domestic audiences any 
real credible commitment to change their policies and practices.55  
                                                                                                                        
whether the state had experienced a civil war with more than twenty-five deaths 
per year during the period between 1990 and 1998.  Id. at 238.  However, twenty-
five battle deaths in one year does not necessarily capture “violent states” or states 
at risk of committing mass atrocities since twenty-five battle deaths is not a very 
large number and does not address whether the government is responsible for 
those deaths as a result of any “criminal” action or other poor practices.  Nor are 
twenty-five battle deaths sufficient to constitute a civil war as most scholars 
understand it.  Rather, the widely-used Correlates of War dataset classifies civil 
wars as those having at least one thousand war-related casualties per year of 
conflict.  See Meredith Reid Sarkees, Codebook for the Intra-State Wars v.4.0: 
Definitions and Variables 1–2, COW, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ 
COW2%20Data/WarData_NEW/Intra-StateWars_Codebook.pdf (last visited Oct. 
12, 2012); Meredith Reid Sarkees, The COW Typology of War: Defining and 
Categorizing Wars (Version 4 of the Data) 5, COW, 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/WarData_NEW/COW% 
20Website%20-%20Typology%20of%20war.pdf (last visited, Oct. 12, 2012). 
55 See Hathaway, Cost of Commitment, supra note 6, at 1856–57 
(“[N]ondemocratic nations with worse human rights ratings are not much less 
likely—and are even occasionally more likely—to commit than nondemocratic 
nations with better ratings. . . . [I]f we . . . settle for toothless treaties, nations with 
poor human rights records—especially nondemocratic nations—may join them to 
gain an expressive benefit with no intention of actually complying.”). 
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Accordingly, I expect that non-democracies with poor practices 
will typically be more backward-looking in rationally calculating 
the costs associated with joining an international human rights 
treaty and be wary of joining treaties other than those with weak 
enforcement mechanisms. 
3.1.2.2.2.  Democratic Lock-In 
Finally, Andrew Moravcsik also theorizes that some states will 
have reasons to be forward-looking in rationally calculating the 
costs and benefits of treaty commitment.  Moravcsik suggests that 
for newly transitioning democracies, the sovereignty costs 
associated with joining international human rights treaties can be 
outweighed by the benefits of locking in the treaty’s principles and 
thereby constraining the activities of future governments that may 
seek to subvert democracy.56  In his study of state commitment to 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, he found that dictatorships and 
established democracies voted against binding human rights 
guarantees during treaty negotiations, whereas the newly created 
democracies supported binding guarantees.57  Accordingly, some 
newly democratic countries may conclude that the costs of 
complying with international human rights treaties are relatively 
low since they would have adopted—or at least intended to 
adopt—domestic policies that are consistent with treaty terms.  
Furthermore, the benefits that new democracies may realize by 
locking future governments in to following their liberal policies 
may outweigh the risk that the state may not be able to 
immediately and fully comply with treaty terms.  Nevertheless, 
                                                     
56 See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic 
Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217, 225–30 (2000) (presenting the 
“republican liberal” explanation of the benefits of commitment to international 
treaties, and arguing that “recently established and potentially unstable 
democracies” facing real threats from nondemocratic domestic groups are the 
regimes most likely to accept a reduction in sovereignty in exchange for a 
reduction in political uncertainty). 
57 Id. at 232–233 (identifying Austria, France, Italy, Iceland, Ireland, and 
Germany—states only continuously democratic beginning between 1920 and 
1950—as “new democracies” voting against the ECHR).  Cf. Edward D. Mansfield 
& Jon C. Pevehouse, Democratization and International Organizations, 60 INT’L ORG. 
137, 138 (2006) (arguing that newly democratizing nations are especially likely to 
enter international organizations because doing so would allow the state to 
“credibly commit to carry out democratic reforms and . . . reduce the prospect of 
reversions to authoritarianism”). 
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scholars empirically examining state commitment to the 
Convention Against Torture and the ICC treaty found little 
support for the explanatory power of the democratic lock-in 
theory.58 
3.2.  The External Pressures View 
According to some other theories, states will commit to 
international human rights treaties even if rational cost and benefit 
calculations show that compliance with treaty terms may be 
difficult or impossible—meaning that a state could risk significant 
sovereignty losses if the treaty contains strong enforcement 
mechanisms.  In addition to the general pressure to act 
appropriately and consistently with international norms, states 
may experience external pressures from others—such as powerful 
states, non-governmental organizations, and civil society—to join 
international institutions embodying and furthering these norms.  
Although they would prefer to guard their sovereignty and avoid 
constraints on their ability to govern domestically, states may join 
international human rights treaties in the hopes that ratification 
will make them appear more legitimate, and thus worthy of extra-
treaty benefits such as investment, aid, and trade.59  As Emilie M. 
Hafner-Burton notes, many states are required to commit to 
                                                     
58 See Goodliffe & Hawkins, supra note 49, at 365 (finding no statistically 
significant correlation between the age or stability of a democracy or the volatility 
of the regime and the likelihood of signing or ratifying the CAT); Jay Goodliffe & 
Darren Hawkins, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Rome: Explaining 
International Criminal Court Negotiations, 71 J. POL. 977, 994 (2009) (finding a “lack 
of correlation” between countries’ level of democracy and support for the 
International Criminal Court, and thus no strong evidence for Moravcsik’s lock-in 
hypothesis).  
59 See, e.g., Goodliffe & Hawkins, supra note 49, at 361 (describing this “logic 
of consequences” explanation of incentivized behavior); Beth A. Simmons, 
International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International 
Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819, 819–20 (2000) (arguing that 
reputational concerns drive international treaty compliance); SIMMONS, supra note 
22, at 77 (suggesting that governments may have no intention of complying with 
treaty obligations and instead have ulterior motives for ratifying treaties such as 
the expectation of positive publicity stemming from ratification or the expectation 
that more tangible benefits, such as favorable trade terms, will flow from 
ratification); Wotipka & Tsutsui, supra note 22, at 734–35 (explaining that 
ratification follows from weaker states’ desire to demonstrate their legitimacy and 
credibility to more powerful states in order to receive benefits from powerful 
states). 
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improving certain domestic human rights practices in order to 
obtain the benefits of certain preferential trade agreements.60 
States may also be pressured directly or indirectly to commit to 
the treaties their neighbors ratify so as to signal that they are 
legitimate members of the region. Thus, even if a state cannot 
comply with treaty terms, it may conclude that appearing like its 
neighbors can produce other extra-treaty benefits—for example, 
participation in regional trade arrangements61—that can outweigh 
the sovereignty costs of commitment, at least where treaty 
enforcement mechanisms are weak. 
4. COMPLIANCE COSTS AND THE CREDIBLE THREAT OF 
STRONG ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 
4.1.  The Credible Threat Theory 
My argument about state commitment to international human 
rights treaties is in the rationalist family, but is retrospective in 
nature.  I argue that a state’s decision about whether to join 
international human rights treaties depends on whether the state 
has been good so far, not on whether the state would like to be 
good in the future.  I suggest states will view treaties with stronger 
enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat and will be more 
likely to commit only if their rational calculations about their past 
behavior suggest they will be able to comply with treaty terms.  I 
pit the credible threat theory against the two other main alternative 
theories described above which seek to explain state commitment 
to international human rights treaties: (1) the rationalist and 
prospective credible commitment theory advanced by Simmons 
and Danner in their study of ICC commitment; and (2) the external 
pressures theories. 
My credible threat argument has two main components: (1) the 
strength of the anticipated enforcement mechanism, and (2) the 
state’s ability to comply with the terms of the treaty.  As to the first 
component, I focus on enforcement mechanisms because it is 
through enforcement mechanisms that states can be held to their 
                                                     
60 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade 
Agreements Influence Government Repression, 59 INT’L ORG. 593, 595 (2005) (asserting 
that preferential trade agreements that implement “hard” standards and a 
“conditional supply of valuable goods” are more effective than softer human 
rights agreements in changing the basic conduct of repressive governments). 
61 See, e.g., Goodliffe & Hawkins, supra note 49, at 361 (describing the “logic 
of consequences” view of state’s decision to ratify an international treaty). 
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commitment agreeing to further the treaty’s goals and protect 
individual human rights.  I define an enforcement mechanism62 as 
the formal grant of power from states to some entity or institution 
with authority to oversee state compliance with treaty terms.  The 
weakest enforcement mechanisms lack clear obligations, precision, 
or a precise delegation of authority or responsibility—”soft law” in 
the language of Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal.63  Stronger, 
“hard law” enforcement mechanisms are precise and binding and, 
for example, will contain a formal grant of power to a committee or 
court to engage in authoritative, institutionalized, and legally 
binding decision-making.64  As Darren Hawkins argues, strong 
enforcement mechanisms provide for authorized decision-makers 
who are “officially empowered by states to interpret and apply the 
rule of law, and control resources that can be used to prevent 
abuses or to punish offenders.”65  States should view strong 
enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat and be wary of 
committing to treaties with such mechanisms unless they can 
comply with treaty terms because non-compliance can be costly. 
As to the second component—ability to comply, I focus 
primarily on a state’s record of human rights practices.  I argue 
that states rationally calculating their ability to comply with treaty 
terms should consider their past and present human rights 
practices since that record can provide information about how the 
state or its leaders will likely behave in the future.  Where an 
international human rights treaty contains stronger enforcement 
mechanisms, states should view the treaty as a credible threat and 
                                                     
62 For this discussion about enforcement and legalization, I draw on the work 
of several scholars.  See Darren Hawkins, Explaining Costly Institutions: Persuasion 
and Enforceable Human Rights Norms, 48 INT’L STUD. Q. 779, 781 (2004) (explaining 
that for enforcement to occur, the states must give agents power to “interpret and 
apply” the law and to use resources to “prevent abuses or punish offenders.”); 
Kenneth W. Abbott et al., Legalization and World Politics: An Introduction, 54 INT’L 
ORG. 401, 418 (2000) (noting centralized enforcement mechanisms in which 
international agencies have the power to withhold benefits, technical assistance, 
or rights of participation to violators); Donnelly, supra note 23, at 603–05 (stating 
that the enforcement of international norms is one of the primary “international 
decision-making activities” and involves stronger forms of international 
monitoring). 
63 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 422–24 (2000) (explaining that the sphere of “soft 
law” begins once legal arrangements are weakened along one or more of the 
dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation). 
64 Id. 
65 Hawkins, supra note 61, at 781. 
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be more likely to commit only if they intend to and can comply 
with the treaty’s terms.  Where enforcement mechanisms are weak, 
however, states may rationally commit regardless of their ability to 
comply with treaty terms. 
For several reasons, my credible threat argument is centered on 
compliance costs specifically derived from the treaty text and 
states’ backward looking calculations about the potential for 
compliance with treaty terms.  First, I emphasize costs, as opposed 
to any benefits states may obtain by commitment, because on the 
whole, by their terms, international human rights treaties do not 
provide tangible reciprocal benefits to their members.66  Instead, 
states should expect to have constraints imposed on how they can 
act domestically towards their citizens, unless those states have 
already imposed those same domestic constraints upon 
themselves.  Thus, commitment to international human rights 
treaties requires the state to bind itself to act in a certain way.  It is 
true that by self-binding, states can hope to obtain the benefit of 
encouraging other states to also bind themselves to respecting 
human rights.  And the ultimate outcome of all that binding may 
be a more peaceful world and one in which states do not have to 
engage in costly interventions to help “solve” other states’ human 
rights abuses.  It is also true, as the external pressure theories 
predict, that some states may join treaties because they hope to 
obtain extra-treaty benefits such as increased aid or trade.  
However, while a state might be rational in ratifying toothless 
treaties for those reasons, the credible threat theory predicts that 
where enforcement mechanisms are stronger, states will first 
determine whether they can comply with treaty terms and thus 
avoid a costly loss of sovereignty.  Therefore, because international 
human rights treaties by their terms purport to constrain state 
domestic behavior, and because states can face a significant loss of 
sovereignty should they violate treaty terms—as long as 
enforcement mechanisms are strong—I expect states will first be 
concerned with compliance costs when making ratification 
decisions. 
Second, I focus on the costs that flow from the treaty’s terms, 
rather than costs a state might incur when deciding to ratify any 
                                                     
66 See Hathaway, Cost of Commitment, supra note 5, at 1823 (noting that 
international human rights treaties differ from arms control agreements and trade 
agreements which, by their terms, provide concrete reciprocal benefits to states in 
exchange for their commitment to act in particular ways). 
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treaty—such as domestic ratification costs relating to the number 
of legislative veto players—because those terms are the primary 
guide of a state’s obligations and the risks it faces if it fails to 
comply with those obligations.  In addition, although in some cases 
states may look to other similar treaties or the actions of treaty 
bodies that oversee compliance with other similar treaties to help 
them interpret the actual strength and meaning of a treaty’s 
enforcement mechanisms, it is the actual treaty terms that describe 
the enforcement mechanisms that will be applied to ensure 
compliance with that treaty.  Moreover, as to the ICC specifically, 
since the ICC treaty is relatively new, states can really only look to 
the treaty’s terms for information about the strength of the treaty’s 
enforcement mechanisms to punish bad and noncompliant 
behavior. 
Finally, my credible threat argument concentrates on 
retrospective, backward-looking cost calculations, rather than the 
prospective calculations Simmons and Danner argue to explain 
ICC commitment, for the reasons stated in Section 3.1.2.2.1 above.  
Briefly, however, the very fact that an autocratic regime has 
refused to implement domestic laws requiring it to improve its 
practices or put in place other checks on its powers—by, for 
example, appointing an independent judiciary—suggests that it 
may not wish to commit itself to an international institution that 
could impose restraints on its domestic behavior.  Yet, that is 
precisely the argument of the credible commitment theory: 
autocracies with bad human rights practices will want to bind 
themselves to a strong international enforcement mechanism in 
order to tie their hands and force them to be good in the future.  
While this theory may explain the behavior of some autocratic 
states with bad practices, it seems reasonable to expect that most 
states with these characteristics would not want to take the gamble 
that they will not live up to their commitment and risk a loss of 
sovereignty.  Thus, the prediction of the credible threat theory is 
essentially the opposite of the prediction of the credible 
commitment theory.  I expect to find that autocratic states and 
states with worse human rights practices will readily commit to 
international human rights treaties with weak enforcement 
mechanisms, but will be wary of committing to treaties with strong 
enforcement mechanisms like those contained in the ICC treaty.67 
                                                     
67 See Hathaway, Cost of Commitment, supra note 5, at 1856–57 (finding that 
states with worse human rights practices are less likely to comply with human 
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4.2.   Categorizing Levels of Enforcement Mechanisms in International 
Human Rights Treaties 
I test the credible threat theory empirically using the six main 
international human rights treaties (together with their articles and 
optional protocols), as well as the ICC treaty.  Below, I first 
describe the five different levels of enforcement mechanisms found 
in those treaties.  I then categorize the different treaties, articles, 
and optional protocols used in this study according to those five 
different levels. 
Most international human rights treaties are characterized by 
“soft law” enforcement mechanisms.68  While many provide for an 
independent body to oversee compliance and enforcement, most 
do not grant those independent bodies—typically committees—
any legally binding authority to punish bad and noncompliant 
behavior.  The six main international human rights treaties contain 
what I characterize as the very weakest enforcement mechanisms: 
they only require the state to submit regular reports to a committee 
about the state’s efforts to comply with treaty terms.  Self-reporting 
requirements are particularly weak enforcement mechanisms 
because they lack clear and precise obligations, and moreover, the 
body to which states have delegated authority to consider the 
reports has no power to absolutely compel reports—or, for that 
matter, better domestic human rights practices.  Indeed, as Jack 
Donnelly notes, the committees cannot even ensure that the 
required reports are submitted on time.69  Furthermore, by filing 
even a pro forma report, the state will have formally discharged its 
reporting requirement since “whatever the quality of the report, 
once it has been reviewed, the monitoring process typically ends 
until the next report is due, in five years.”70  Donnelly further 
explains that while reporting procedures are useful in that they 
provide a concrete reminder for states to review their practices, 
those procedures cannot be used to force recalcitrant states into 
actually improving their practices.71 
                                                                                                                        
rights treaties with stronger enforcement mechanisms and are more likely to 
comply with treaties with “toothless” enforcement mechanisms). 
68 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 62, at 422–24 (noting that the majority of 
international laws are deemed “soft law” and explaining the justifications and 
benefits of using soft law enforcement mechanisms in international law). 
69 DONNELLY, supra note 26, at 85. 
70 Id. (discussing the Human Rights Committee). 
71 Id. at 87. 
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States can, however, agree to be bound by more onerous 
enforcement mechanisms beyond simply state-reporting.  First, 
states can agree on a committee’s competence to hear complaints 
by other states claiming that they are not living up to their 
obligations under the treaty.72  On paper, this enforcement 
mechanism appears stronger than the self-reporting requirement 
since it at least requires state parties to submit to a grievance 
procedure before an independent committee.  Nevertheless, it 
bears noting that in the present system, committees are not 
empowered to order a remedy for any violations they find: if the 
matter cannot be resolved via negotiation, the committee is 
generally limited to summarizing its activities in a report.73 
In addition, some treaties allow states to agree on a 
committee’s competence to receive and consider complaints by 
individuals alleging that their rights under the treaty have been 
violated—if the individuals have, among other things, exhausted 
available domestic remedies.74  The individual complaints are 
heard by a committee empowered to consider evidence and issue 
decisions.  In some cases, the committee may also invite the state 
party to submit written responses to the views stated in the 
committee’s decision and to comment on action taken as a result.75  
However, even then, none of these optional procedures associated 
with the six main international human rights treaties grants to the 
committee any powers to issue legally binding decisions.  Instead, 
committee powers are essentially limited to encouraging 
                                                     
72 For example, under Article 41 of the ICCPR, states may authorize the 
Human Rights Committee to hear interstate complaints, but only if both state 
parties have formally acknowledged the Committee’s competence to receive and 
consider inter-state communications.  The provisions of Article 21 of the CAT are 
similar. 
73 See, e.g., CAT Optional Protocol, supra note 28, art. 21(h) (instructing parties 
to submit a report including a brief statement of the facts); ICCPR, supra note 6, 
art. 41(h) (stating that the Committee shall limit its report to a brief statement of 
the facts). 
74 Several of the main international human rights treaties include articles or 
optional protocols with this additional enforcement mechanism.  See, e.g., CAT 
Optional Protocol, supra note 28, art. 22 (stating that no claim shall be heard unless 
competence of the committee is declared by the state); CEDAW Optional Protocol, 
supra note 27 (authorizing the state to hear the claims brought if it deems the 
committee competent); ICCPR First Optional Protocol, supra note 27 (allowing 
state to determine committee’s competence to hear claims); CERD, supra note 6, 
art. 14 (authorizing the state to hear such claims only if it deems the committee 
competent). 
75 For example, in Article 7, the CEDAW Optional Protocol permits the 
Committee to seek comments and reports on actions taken by states. 
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compliance and issuing reports of its actions.76  Moreover, 
according to the website for the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, as of August 2010, the procedures for interstate 
complaints had never been used.77 
Although there is not an enormous difference between the 
latter two enforcement mechanisms in terms of the precision of 
their requirements or the power of the committees, I conclude that 
the individual complaint mechanism may be costlier for states for 
several reasons. First, states should expect more individual 
complaints than state complaints because individuals within a 
state are more likely than other states to actually know of the 
actual state’s human rights practices.  Second there are also more 
individuals in a state than there are other states.  Finally, the 
evidence suggests that states are not inclined to use the interstate 
complaint procedure, a fact which later-ratifying states would 
know when considering the strength of that enforcement 
mechanism.  By contrast, the various committees have received 
and considered individual complaints and have rendered 
decisions.  Again, however, those decisions are not subject to 
appeal, and if the committee decides in favor of the individual, it 
cannot force a remedy: it is limited to inviting the state party to 
show how it has resolved the issue. 
Under the Optional Protocol to the CAT, states may commit to 
a seemingly stronger enforcement mechanism.  By that Optional 
Protocol, states bind themselves to recognize the competence of a 
Subcommittee on Prevention to regularly visit any place under its 
jurisdiction and control where persons are held in detention by the 
government or with its acquiescence.78  The visits are undertaken 
in an effort to strengthen, if necessary, the detainees’ rights to be 
protected against torture and other cruel and inhumane 
punishment.79 In connection with the visits, parties agree to 
                                                     
76 See, e.g., CEDAW Optional Protocol, supra note 27, arts. 7, 12 (describing 
the committee’s powers as essentially overseeing compliance and issuing reports 
on its actions); ICCPR First Optional Protocol, supra note 28, arts. 5, 6 (stating that 
the role of the committee shall not exceed reporting on its actions and monitoring 
compliance). 
77 See Human Rights Treaty Bodies—Petitions, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ 
petitions/index.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2012) (stating that although state parties 
are permitted to complain to the relevant treaty body about alleged violations by 
other states, no state has ever done so). 
78 CAT Optional Protocol, supra note 28, arts. 4, 11. 
79 Id. art. 4. 
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provide all relevant information to the Subcommittee, as well as 
access to private interviews of detainees—without the presence of 
witnesses.80  Pursuant to Article 16, the Subcommittee is 
authorized to publish reports of its investigations, together with 
any comments the state party may wish to include.81  In the event 
the state party does not cooperate with the Subcommittee and does 
not authorize access to information and interviews, or refuses to 
take steps to improve a situation identified by the Subcommittee, 
the Subcommittee may—after the state party has had an 
opportunity to make its views known—make a public statement 
concerning the matter or publish a report about it.82 
The committee with oversight of the CAT Optional Protocol, 
like the other committees, is generally limited at the conclusion of 
its investigation to encouraging compliance and making comments 
or reports.  I suggest, though, that the enforcement mechanism 
associated with the CAT Optional Protocol is stronger than those 
described above because it requires states to allow an independent 
body onto sovereign territory and to grant access to citizenry or 
other prisoners under state control.  While all states will not 
necessarily comply with that requirement, sidestepping the 
requirement is certainly not as easy as filing a pro forma report.  
Furthermore, neither the interstate nor individual complaint 
procedures purport to bind the state parties to allowing a 
committee to visit the territory and conduct its own investigation 
of the facts. 
On the other hand, in none of the above instances have states 
delegated to an independent body the power to make legally 
binding decisions.  Thus, even the strongest of these enforcement 
mechanisms giving committees powers to monitor compliance 
may not be very “strong.”  Of course, even if they are not “strong” 
enforcement mechanisms, they may still help prompt states to 
improve their respect for individual human rights.  For example, 
the reports, decisions, and comments by the committees may 
shame states into improving their domestic policies and practices.  
Those reports, decisions, and comments can also be accessed by 
states, NGOs, and domestic civil society and similarly used by any 
of them to shame states into complying with international human 
rights norms.  Regarding the level of the enforcement mechanisms 
                                                     
80 Id. arts. 12, 14. 
81 Id. art. 16. 
82 Id. 
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to which states bind themselves pursuant to the treaty’s terms, 
however, the fact remains that the committees do not have legally 
binding adjudicatory power with resources to compel compliance 
and punish bad and noncompliant behavior. 
Rather, of the fourteen treaties, articles, or protocols in this 
study, the ICC treaty can best be characterized as having relatively 
strong “hard law” enforcement mechanisms.  Indeed, the ICC 
treaty is unlike any international human rights treaty that has gone 
before it.  Pursuant to the terms and provisions of the Rome 
Statute, states have designated to an independent entity the 
authority to determine whether there is evidence to believe an 
individual or group committed one of the covered crimes within 
the territory of a State Party.  In addition, they have delegated the 
power to determine whether the state which would otherwise have 
jurisdiction over the matter is itself either unwilling or unable to 
prosecute the wrongdoers.  And, by committing to the treaty 
creating the ICC, states agree that such investigations may be 
commenced against the state’s own nationals for the covered 
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, as 
long as those crimes were committed after the Court came into 
existence or after the state ratified the treaty, whichever is later.  
Furthermore, unlike the committees associated with the other 
international human rights treaties, the ICC does control resources 
that can be used to prevent abuses or to punish offenders. 
For example, the ICC may issue arrest warrants to bring 
individuals or groups to stand trial for their crimes before judges at 
the ICC in The Hague.  And, states and individuals have 
responded to the ICC’s power of arrest.  Some states have 
cooperated in bringing suspects to The Hague for trial.83  Other 
                                                     
83 Belgian authorities arrested the former Vice-President of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo—who was the subject of a sealed arrest warrant—during 
his visit to the country.  Agence France-Presse, Congo Ex-Official Is Held In Belgium 
on War Crimes Charges, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/05/25/world/africa/25congo.html?ref=africa.  In November 2011, Ivory 
Coast authorities surrendered Laurent Gbagbo pursuant to an ICC arrest warrant 
in connection with an investigation into the situation in the Ivory Coast opened by 
the ICC wherein Mr. Gbagbo is charged with allegedly committing mass atrocities 
in the aftermath of the country’s presidential elections in 2010.  Press Release, Int’l 
Criminal Court [ICC], New Suspect in the ICC’s Custody: Laurent Gbagbo 
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suspects have voluntarily appeared in The Hague in order to avoid 
having warrants issued for their arrest.84 
Of course, notwithstanding these powers to effectuate arrests 
and prosecute those who commit mass atrocities, some suspects 
may initially escape justice.  The ICC has informed the United 
Nations Security Council of the failure of ICC States Parties 
Djibouti, Chad, Kenya, and Malawi to execute on the ICC’s 
warrant for the arrest of President Omar Bashir of Sudan during 
his visits to these countries.85  Nevertheless, the power delegated to 
the ICC is still of a legally binding nature.  Suspects may be able to 
escape arrest by staying in-state, hiding, or visiting only friendly 
states (and suspects can always escape arrest in similar ways even 
under domestic criminal law systems where police forces can 
effectuate arrests).  But, those suspects are not completely free to 
do as they please, as President Bashir no doubt knows.  Malawi’s 
new President, Joyce Banda, publicly announced in June 2012 that 
her country would not host an African Union summit if she was 
obligated to invite Bashir as head of an AU member state, noting 
how strained ties with key donors in the international community 
became after her predecessor allowed Bashir to visit.86  
                                                     
84 Press Release, ICC, As Darfur Rebel Commanders Surrender to the Court, 
ICC Prosecutor “welcomes compliance with the Court’s decisions and with 
Resolution 1593 (2005) of the Security Council,” ICC-OTP-20100616-PR548 (June 
16, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations% 
20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/related%20cases/ 
icc02050309/press%20release/pr548 (addressing the arrival of two Darfur rebel 
commanders to answer charges and face prosecution for their conduct); Kenya: Q 
& A on Pre-Trial Hearing in First ICC Case, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 30, 2011), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/08/30/kenya-qa-pre-trial-hearing-first-icc-
case (noting that six Kenyans charged with committing mass atrocities in the 
aftermath of the country’s 2007 presidential elections voluntarily appeared in The 
Hague to face charges pursuant to a summons to appear). 
85 Press Release, ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I informs the United Nations 
Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties About Chad’s Non-
cooperation in the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Al Bashir, ICC-CPI-20111213-





86 See Malawi Cancels AU Summit Hosting Over Sudan’s Leader Invite, RADIO 
NETH. WORLDWIDE (June 8, 2012, 1:42 PM), http://www.rnw.nl/international-
justice/article/malawi-cancels-au-summit-hosting-over-sudans-leader-invite 
(“Malawi’s new president, Joyce Banda, said in May that she wanted Bashir to 
stay away from the [AU] summit . . . to avoid straining ties with key donors for 
her impoverished country.”). 
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Furthermore, although the fact of the arrest warrant may actually 
provoke some suspects to engage in additional abuses or 
repressive behavior in order to fight against the ICC’s authority, in 
many ways this only demonstrates the strength of the ICC’s 
enforcement mechanism.  Accordingly, I argue that the 
enforcement mechanisms in the fourteen different treaties that are 
the subject of this study can be arranged from weakest to strongest 
as follows: (1) the state agrees to a self-reporting requirement; (2) 
the state recognizes committee competence to hear state 
complaints; (3) the state recognizes committee competence to hear 
individual complaints; (4) the state agrees to permit committee 
visits to its territory to engage in investigations; and (5) the state 
agrees to authorize an independent body to prosecute its 
government or citizenry for human rights crimes.  Table 2 lists the 
fourteen treaties, articles, or protocols (together with the year they 
were available for ratification), and organizes them by their 
associated levels of enforcement mechanisms. 
 





Description of Mechanism Human Rights Treaty 
1-weakest State must file reports ICCPR (1966); ICESCR (1966); 
CERD (1966); CEDAW (1980); 
CAT (1984); CRC (1989) 
2-weak States make complaints to 
committee 
Article 41 ICCPR (1966); 
Article 21 CAT (1984) 
3-moderate Individuals file complaints 
with committee 
Optional Protocol ICCPR 
(1966); Article 14 CERD 
(1966); Article 22 CAT (1984); 
Optional Protocol CEDAW 
(1999) 
4-stronger Committee may visit state Optional Protocol CAT (2003) 




5. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study tests the credible threat theory quantitatively and 
pits that theory against the credible commitment theory and the 
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external pressures theories described in Section 3 above.  
According to the credible threat theory, states will be more likely to 
ratify international human rights treaties with relatively strong 
enforcement mechanisms if their rational and backward looking 
cost calculations suggest commitment will not result in a 
significant loss of sovereignty.87  If the theory is correct, the 
statistical evidence should show that states with poor human 
rights practices will be just as likely as states with good human 
rights practices to readily ratify international human rights treaties 
containing the weakest enforcement mechanisms.  States with 
poorer records, however, should be much less likely to ratify 
treaties with stronger enforcement mechanisms that can be used to 
punish bad and noncompliant behavior.  Regarding in particular 
the treaty creating the ICC, the evidence should show that states 
with poorer human rights practices—namely, the states that are 
least likely to be able to comply with treaty terms and avoid being 
subjected to the treaty’s relatively strong enforcement 
mechanisms—will refuse to join the Court. 
The predictions of the credible commitment and the external 
pressures theories are in stark contrast to those of the credible 
threat theory.  Those theories predict that even where enforcement 
mechanisms are stronger, states that may not be able to readily 
comply with treaty terms will still ratify.88  According to the 
credible commitment theory, in fact, where enforcement 
mechanisms are strongest—as they are in the ICC treaty—states 
with poor records and that are also non-democracies will join the 
Court in order to signal to their domestic audiences their intention 
to be better in the future.  According to pressure theories, even 
states with poor past and present human rights practices will 
commit to treaties with stronger enforcement mechanisms because 
they are directly or indirectly pressured to join in order to obtain 
some extra-treaty benefits such as increased aid or trade. 
5.1.   Methodology 
I use event history analysis89—specifically, a Cox proportional-
hazards model—to test the explanatory power of the credible 
threat theory and to test it against the credible commitment and 
external pressures theories.  Event history analysis is an 
                                                     
87 See supra Section 4. 
88 See supra Sections 3.1.2.2.1, 3.2 
89 Event history analysis is also called “survival” analysis. 
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appropriate methodology to use to examine state commitment to 
the various international human rights treaties in this study 
because it allows the researcher to incorporate both constant and 
time-varying factors into the quantitative model.90  For example, 
the researcher can include in the model data that varies over time, 
such as a state’s yearly human rights and democracy ratings.  The 
researcher can also include data that does not vary year-to-year, 
such as whether the state follows a common law or civil law legal 
tradition. 
Event history models test each state’s “time until” the event of 
treaty ratification and what factors speed up or slow down that 
time line to commitment.  I examine state commitment to each of 
the fourteen different treaties in this study using separate, but 
parallel, analyses.  Appendix A lists the fourteen different treaties 
and shows the states that are parties to each. 
5.2.  Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables in the study are the time to ratification 
of each of the fourteen different international human rights 
treaties.  Ratification data on the fourteen different international 
human rights treaties were coded from the United Nations.  The 
data is assembled at yearly intervals for more than 190 countries 
between 1966 and 2008.  Countries existing at the time the treaty 
was adopted and available for ratification in that year are “at risk” 
of ratifying during that year.  Countries established after the treaty 
was available for ratification enter the risk set upon 
independence—the year when they are eligible to ratify as a 
sovereign state.  Countries at risk are given a value of 0 until such 
time as they ratify the instrument in question.  At the time of 
ratification—when the event happens—countries are assigned a 
value of 1.  Countries that did not ratify by 2008, when the 
observation period here ends, are right-censored since the event for 
them never happened, but can still happen. 
5.3.  The Main Explanatory Variable: Level of Human Rights Practices 
While each treaty does have its own terms and particular rights 
that it is designed to protect, all have in common that they are 
                                                     
90 For a comprehensive description of event history analysis, see, for 
example, PAUL D. ALLISON, EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS: REGRESSION FOR 
LONGITUDINAL EVENT DATA (1984); EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS WITH STATA (Hans-
Peter Blossfeld et al. eds., 2007). 
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designed to require states and their leaders to promote better 
domestic human rights practices and protect against and punish 
any human rights abuses.  Therefore, in order to consistently test 
commitment across the various treaties, I use one main explanatory 
variable to measure the state’s ability to comply with treaty terms.  
In this case, that measure is the level of the state’s human rights 
practices.  Since the treaties in this study by their terms all require 
states to adhere to good human rights practices, compliance should 
be easiest and less costly for those states with policies and practices 
that are consistent with treaty terms.  By contrast, states with bad 
past and present human rights practices should calculate that 
compliance would be difficult and also potentially quite costly if 
the treaty has relatively strong enforcement mechanisms. 
To measure a state’s level of human rights practices, I use the 
Political Terror Scale, which is a generally-recognized human 
rights measure obtained from human rights reports issued by 
Amnesty International and the U.S. Department of State.  The 
reports assign country scores by considering the presence of 
government practices that include murder, torture, forced 
disappearances, and political imprisonment.  The scale ranges from 
1 to 5, where 1 corresponds with torture and political 
imprisonments occurring only rarely and the country generally 
protecting human rights.91  Thus, states assigned a 1 will have the 
best human rights practices using this scale, and states assigned a 5 
will have the worst practices.  When possible, I average the two 
scores reported.92  Data on these human rights practices are 
available beginning in 1976 and are reported from each year 
                                                     
91 I chose not to include in my model a measure of “recent civil wars” as did 
Simmons and Danner because, as previously noted, I do not believe that measure 
best captures the concept of the level of a state’s human rights practices or the 
likelihood that it will commit a mass atrocity.  See supra note 53.  On the other 
hand, the political terror data on human rights practices directly measures a 
state’s tendency to commit the kinds of human rights violations that cause it to 
run afoul of the terms of the various international human rights treaties described 
above, as well as subject the state’s leaders and citizens to an ICC prosecution.   
92 Averaging the scores should help mitigate any bias from using only scores 
based on Amnesty International or the U.S. State Department reports.  In any 
event, scholars have found that over time, the similarity between the reports of 
the two entities has increased.  See Steven C. Poe et al., Repression of the Human 
Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 
1976–1993, 43 INT’L STUD. Q. 291, 301–02 (1999) (arguing that selection bias of 
Amnesty International and U.S. Department of State personal integrity abuse 
measures can be “addressed by substitution” and that these measures eventually 
converge to be “virtually identical”). 
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thereafter until 2008.  Similar to Cole,93 for the period between 1966 
and 1976 (a time period relevant to the examination of several of 
the treaties), I extrapolate missing data points using a state’s 
median score over the period from 1976 to 1984 if data is 
available.94  Again, because each of the treaties being tested is 
designed to ensure that states promote better human rights 
practices and protect against, and punish, human rights abuses, the 
data should adequately measure a state’s tendency to have in place 
policies and practices that would enable it to comply with these 
treaties. 
5.4.   Control Variables 
I also include several control variables in the model to account 
for the various other theories that scholars have advanced to 
explain state commitment to international human rights treaties 
(outlined in Section 3 above).  I describe each of these control 
variables briefly below.  Appendix B describes in more detail the 
nature and source of the data used to measure the control 
variables. 
                                                     
93 See Cole, supra note 22, at 480 (“Missing data points between 1966 and 1974 
are extrapolated from a country’s median score over the period 1975–1999.”). 
94 I considered using the physical integrity rights measure reported in the 
Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset.  That measure also ranks a state’s 
respect for human rights based on data from Amnesty International and U.S. State 
Department reports addressing tortures, extrajudicial killings, political 
imprisonments, and disappearances.  The physical integrity rating is specified on 
a 0 to 8 scale, with 8 representing full governmental respect for physical rights.  
However, the Cingranelli-Richards data is only available beginning in 1981, 
making it not as comprehensive for these purposes as the data available from the 
Political Terror Scale, which begins in 1976.  Compare The CIRI Human Rights Data 
Project, CIRI HUMAN RIGHTS DATA PROJECT, http://ciri.binghamton.edu/index.asp 
(last revised Jan. 14 2012) with The Political Terror Scale Online, POLITICAL TERROR 
SCALE, www.politicalterrorscale.org/ptsdata.php (last updated Nov. 3, 2012).  
Furthermore, the other studies that compare ratification decisions across 
international human rights treaties beginning in 1966 also use the Political Terror 
Scale to measure a state’s human rights practices.  See Wotipka & Tsutsui, supra 
note 22, at 743 (describing variables used in analyzing international human rights 
treaties from 1965 to 2001); Cole, supra note 22, at 480 (“Using data collected from 
annual human rights reports issued by Amnesty International and the U.S. 
Department of State, countries are assigned a score of 1 to 5 on an ordinal scale . . . 
.”).  Thus, a comparison to the results of those studies is better facilitated by using 
the same measure here. 
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5.4.1.  The Rationalist View 
To test the idea that democracies are more likely than 
autocracies to ratify international human rights treaties, I include a 
measure of democracy taken from the Polity IV Project. 
I use a state’s gross domestic product (“GDP”) per capita as a 
measure of economic development to test the hypothesis that more 
economically developed states are more likely than less developed 
states to join international human rights treaties.  GDP per capita is 
a standard control variable in cross-national research and is used 
as a proxy for a country’s general level of economic development.95 
To measure the political costs associated with a state’s domestic 
legislative treaty ratification process, I use Simmons’ data, which 
codes ratification processes using a four-category scale according 
to the difficulty of the processes.96 
To test the future domestic uncertainty costs theory and the 
idea that states following a common law tradition are less likely to 
ratify international human rights institutions than those following 
a civil law tradition, I include data on whether a state follows a 
common law legal tradition. 
Finally, I include a control variable to measure the new 
democracy, democratic “lock-in” theory advanced by Andrew 
Moravcsik using a dummy variable derived from the Polity IV 
democracy measure. 
5.4.2.  The External Pressures View 
Regarding external pressures that may influence state 
ratification behavior, I first include a measure to account for the 
idea that less developed states may ratify treaties so as to receive 
extra-treaty benefits from more powerful and wealthier nations.  
                                                     
95 See SIMMONS, supra note 22, at 83–84 tbl.3.1 (using log of GDP per capita 
and log of GDP by size as explanatory variables in evaluating ratification of 
human rights treaties); Cole, supra note 22, at 480 (“Gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita, a standard control variable in cross-national research, proxies a 
country’s general level of economic development.”); Wotipka & Tsutsui, supra 
note 22, at 737 (averring that “level of economic development is a key factor 
shaping governments’ decision to ratify treaties”). 
96 See SIMMONS, supra note 22, app. I at 383 (defining the ratification process 
according to four categories capturing the degree of political difficulty in the 
formal process of ratification including (1) ratification by an individual chief 
executive or cabinet decision, (2) a rule of informing the legislative body of signed 
treaties, (3) majority consent of one legislative body, and (4) a supermajority in 
one legislative body or a majority in two legislative bodies). 
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Like Simmons, I measure this concept using net official 
development assistance and official aid (“ODA”).97  ODA consists 
of the loans and grants made to developing countries. 
Last, I measure the concept concerning regional influence by 
looking at regional density of the ratification of the various treaties, 
articles, and optional protocols.  Regional density computes 
ratification by countries in the same region (using seven World 
Bank categories) up to the previous year.98 
Table 3 provides the summary statistics for the independent 
variables described above and used to test commitment to all 
fourteen international human rights treaties, articles, or optional 
protocols included in this study. 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Common Independent Variables 
 







Level of Human 
Rights 
6597 2.39 1.09 1 5 
Level of Democracy 6498 4 4.18 0 10 
Level of Economic 
Development 




4834 1.57 .65 1 3 
Common Law State 
or Not 
8481 .34 .47 0 1 
Transitioning 
Democracy or Not 
6794 .17 .38 0 1 
Level of Aid or 
Assistance 
7059 .09 .16 -.03 2.68 
 
                                                     
97 See id. app. I at 385 (defining ODA using World Bank data measuring 
official development assistance and official aid, denominated in U.S. dollars, as a 
share of GDP). 
98 The seven World Bank regions are: Sub-Saharan Africa; East Asia/Oceania; 
Eastern Europe/Central Asia; Latin America/Caribbean; Middle East/North 
Africa; South Asia; and the West (Western Europe, Australia, Canada, New 
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6. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
An examination of state ratification patterns provides 
contextual background helpful to understanding the results of the 
event history analysis and also provides preliminary support for 
the idea that states view strong enforcement mechanisms as a 
credible threat.  Table 4 contains a list of the fourteen different 
international human rights treaties that are the subject of this study 
and shows that states with worse human rights practices are 
almost just as likely as states with better human rights practices to 
ratify international human rights treaties with the weakest 
enforcement mechanisms.  However, where enforcement 
mechanisms are stronger, states with worse human rights practices 
are much more likely to avoid commitment. 
 
Table 4: Ratification of the Fourteen Different Treaties Based on 





# Ratified with Better 
Human Rights 
# Ratified with Worse  
Human Rights 
ICCPR 157 83 74 
ICESCR 154 80 74 
CERD 162 86 76 
CEDAW 171 95 76 
CAT 139 73 66 
CRC 174 95 79 
ICCPR Art. 41 47 31 16 
CAT Art. 21 56 39 17 
ICCPR Optional 96 60 36 
CERD Art. 14 47 31 16 
CAT Art. 22 60 37 23 
CEDAW Optional 89 57 32 
CAT Optional 41 29 12 
ICC 98 66 32 
                                                     
99 I classified states with average human rights ratings of 2.5 and below 
during the relevant time periods at which the various treaties could be ratified as 
having better human rights practices.  I classified states with average human 
rights ratings above 2.5 during the relevant time periods as having poorer human 
rights practices. 
100 I obtained the total number of ratifying states from the data which ends in 
2008.  For each treaty, the total possible number of states that could have ratified 
was 178 since those were the states for which human rights data was available.   
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In fact, where the treaties contain only the weakest self-
reporting mechanisms (the first six treaties listed), Table 4 shows 
that the number of states with better and worse ratings ratifying 
the treaty is close to equal.  By contrast, as enforcement 
mechanisms strengthen, states with poorer human rights practices 
tend to account for only about thirty percent of the ratifying 
population.  The figure below illustrates these ratification patterns. 
 
Figure 1: Ratification of the Fourteen Different Treaties Based on 
Average Human Rights Ratings 
 
Examining the ratification patterns of states with the poorest 
human rights ratings101 provides additional support for the 
credible threat theory.  Table 5 shows ratification behavior as it 
relates to the six main international human rights treaties and the 
ICC treaty.  The evidence indicates that states with the poorest 
human rights practices readily and regularly commit to 
international human rights treaties with the weakest enforcement 
mechanisms.  However, states with the poorest practices less 
readily commit to the ICC treaty. 
                                                     
101 States with the poorest ratings are those that consistently averaged above 
2.5 on the political terror scale (which ranges from 1 to 5 with 5 representing the 
worst practices) during each of the five time periods relevant to the seven treaties.  
Those time periods are 1965–2008 (ICCPR, ICESCR, and CERD); 1979–2008 
(CEDAW); 1983–2008 (CAT); 1988–2008 (CRC); and 1997–2008 (ICC). 
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Table 5: Poorest Human Rights Countries and Ratifications 
 
Country ICC CCPR CESCR CERD CEDAW CAT CRC 
Afghanistan 2003 1983 1983 1983 2003 1987 1994 
Albania 2003 1991 1991 1994 1994 1994 1992 
Algeria — 1989 1989 1972 1996 1989 1993 
Andorra 2001 2006 — 2006 1997 2006 1996 
Bangladesh 2010 2000 1998 1979 1984 1998 1990 
Brazil 2002 1992 1992 1968 1984 1989 1990 
Burundi 2004 1990 1990 1977 1992 1993 1990 
Cambodia 2002 1992 1992 1983 1992 1992 1992 
Cameroon — 1984 1984 1970 1994 1986 1993 
Central Afr. 
Rep. 
2001 1981 1981 1971 1991 — 1992 
Chad 2006 1995 1995 1977 1995 1995 1990 
China — — 2001 1981 1980 1988 1992 
Colombia 2002 1969 1969 1981 1982 1987 1991 
Congo (Brazza) 2004 1983 1983 1988 1982 2003 1993 
DRC (Kinshasa) 2002 1976 1976 1976 1986 1996 1990 
Cuba — — — 1972 1980 1995 1991 
Egypt — 1982 1982 1967 1981 1986 1990 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
— 1987 1987 2002 1984 2002 1992 
Eritrea — 2002 2001 2001 1995 — 1994 
Ethiopia — 1993 1993 1976 1981 1994 1991 
Georgia 2003 1994 1994 1999 1994 1994 1994 
Guatemala — 1992 1988 1983 1982 1990 1990 
Guinea 2003 1978 1978 1977 1982 1989 1990 
Haiti — 1991 — 1972 1981 — 1995 
Honduras 2002 1997 1981 2002 1983 1996 1990 
India — 1979 1979 1968 1993 — 1992 
Indonesia — 2006 2006 1999 1984 1998 1990 
Iran  — 1975 1975 1968 — — 1994 
Iraq — 1971 1971 1970 1986 — 1994 
Israel — 1991 1991 1979 1991 1991 1991 
Kenya 2005 1972 1972 2001 1984 1997 1990 
North Korea — 1981 1981 — 2001 — 1990 
Lebanon — 1972 1972 1971 1997 2000 1991 
Liberia 2004 2004 2004 1976 1984 2004 1993 
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Libya — 1970 1970 1968 1989 1989 1993 
Morocco — 1979 1979 1970 1993 1993 1993 
Mozambique — 1993 — 1983 1997 1999 1994 
Mexico 2005 1981 1981 1975 1981 1986 1990 
Myanmar — — — — 1997 — 1991 
Nigeria 2001 1993 1993 1967 1985 2001 1991 
Pakistan — — 2009 1966 1996 — 1990 
Papua New 
Guinea 
— 2008 2008 1982 1995 — 1993 
Paraguay 2001 1992 1992 2003 1987 1990 1990 
Peru 2001 1978 1978 1971 1982 1988 1990 
Philippines — 1986 1974 1967 1981 1986 1990 
Russia — 1973 1973 1969 1981 1987 1990 
Rwanda — 1975 1975 1975 1981 2008 1991 
Saudi Arabia — — — 1997 2000 1997 1996 
Sierra Leone 2000 1996 1996 1967 1988 2001 1990 
Somalia — 1990 1990 1975 — 1990 — 
South Africa 2000 1998 — 1998 1995 1998 1995 
Sri Lanka — 1980 1980 1982 1981 1994 1991 
Sudan — 1986 1986 1977 — — 1990 
Syria — 1969 1969 1969 2003 2004 1993 
Tajikistan 2000 1999 1991 1995 1993 1995 1993 
Thailand — 1996 1999 2003 1985 2007 1992 
Togo — 1984 1984 1972 1983 1987 1990 
Tunisia — 1969 1969 1967 1985 1988 1992 
Turkey — 2003 2003 2002 1985 1988 1995 
Uganda 2002 1995 1987 1980 1985 1986 1990 
Ukraine — 1973 1973 1969 1981 1987 1991 
Uzbekistan — 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1994 
Venezuela 2000 1978 1978 1967 1983 1991 1990 
Yemen — 1987 1987 1972 1984 1991 1991 
Zambia 2002 1984 1984 1972 1985 1998 1991 
Zimbabwe — 1991 1991 1991 1991 — 1990 
 
Specifically, of the sixty-six countries with the poorest human 
rights ratings, sixty-five (all except Myanmar) ratified at least four 
of the six main international human rights treaties.  All but 
eighteen ratified all six treaties.  By contrast, thirty-nine of the 
sixty-six countries with the poorest ratings did not ratify the ICC 
treaty.  Among the thirty-nine countries that did not ratify the ICC 
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treaty, some twenty-three nevertheless ratified all six main 
international human rights treaties—the treaties with the weakest 
enforcement mechanisms.102 
In sum, an examination of state ratification patterns provides 
support for the explanatory power of the credible threat theory.  
The evidence shows that for the most part, states with poorer 
human rights practices are regularly joining treaties with the 
weakest enforcement mechanisms.  They are doing so even though 
their past and present human rights ratings indicate they likely 
cannot comply with treaty terms and promote better domestic 
human rights practices and protect against, and punish, abuses.  Of 
course, by committing to these treaties with the weakest 
enforcement mechanisms, states likely know they cannot be 
punished for bad and noncompliant behavior.  On the other hand, 
those same states are less regularly committing to treaties with 
stronger enforcement mechanisms, including the treaty creating 
the ICC.  Contrary to the predictions of the credible commitment 
theory and the external pressures theories, states with worse 
practices do not seem to be committing overwhelmingly to treaties 
with stronger enforcement mechanisms that can be used to punish 
bad and noncompliant behavior.  Instead, consistent with the 
credible threat theory, it seems that these states with poor practices 
are for the most part looking backwards and rationally calculating 
compliance costs before committing to treaties with which they 
cannot presently comply and that have enforcement mechanisms 
that can be used to hold them to their commitment. 
The results of event history analysis also provide support for 
the idea that states view strong enforcement mechanisms as a 
credible threat and more readily commit to treaties with stronger 
enforcement mechanisms only where they are also willing and able 
to comply with treaty terms.  Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 present the 
results from event history analysis for ratification of the various 
international human rights treaties.  The separate but parallel 
analyses for the fourteen different international human rights 
treaties are shown based on their associated level of enforcement 
mechanisms.  The results are reported as hazard ratios, which 
                                                     
102 Results were consistent for countries that scored even higher on the 
political terror scale.  For countries that consistently averaged above 2.8 during all 
relevant time periods, twenty-nine of forty-three did not ratify the ICC.  However, 
all but Myanmar ratified at least four of the six main international human rights 
treaties.  And, seventeen of the twenty-nine that did not ratify the ICC treaty 
nevertheless ratified all six of the main treaties. 
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indicate the particular factor’s proportionate influence on the 
decision to ratify.  Numbers greater than one indicate an increase 
in the hazard rate of ratification.  Numbers less than one indicate a 
decrease in the hazard rate. 
As Table 6 shows, where enforcement mechanisms are weakest 
and require only self-reporting, the results show no statistically 
significant correlation between a state’s level of human rights 
practices and state ratification behavior.  This finding is consistent 
with Cole’s regarding state commitment to the ICCPR and 
ICESCR—the two main international human rights treaties he 
examined in his study testing state ratification behavior.103  Indeed, 
where enforcement mechanisms are weakest, the primary 
explanatory variable—a state’s level of human rights practices—is 
not a significant predictor of ratification in the tests for any of these 
treaties.  Thus, just as the evidence depicted in Table 4 indicates, 
states with poorer human rights practices seem to be just as likely 
as states with better practices to join international human rights 
treaties with weak enforcement mechanisms that cannot be used to 
punish bad and noncompliant behavior.  For states with better 
practices, of course, whether enforcement mechanisms are weak 
may not be a deciding factor in ratification calculations since the 
state already has policies and practices in place that should not 
cause it to run afoul of treaty terms.  But, states with worse 
practices can decide to commit to treaties with these weakest 
enforcement mechanisms even if they have no ability or intent to 
comply with treaty terms or better their practices because the 




                                                     
103 See Cole, supra note 22, at 483 (analyzing the correlation of various factors 
with the likelihood of ratification of the ICCPR and ICESCR and finding no 
significant trend with respect to human rights practices).  On the other hand, 
Wotipka and Tsutsui found that states’ human rights practices were significantly 
and negatively related to their tendency to ratify the six main human rights 
treaties.  See Wotipka & Tsutsui, supra note 22, at 744–47 (“The effects of . . . 
human rights practice indicate[s] that . . . rights-violating governments are more 
likely to ratify human rights treaties in a given year, all else being equal.”).  
However, those scholars did not separately test commitment to each of the human 
rights treaties as I do—and as Cole did for the two main treaties in his study.  
Rather, in Wotipka and Tsutsui’s study the event examined was whether a state 
ratified any one of seven human rights treaties in a given year between 1965 and 
2001.  See id., at 739. 
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 CCPR CESCR CERD CEDAW CAT CRC 
Level of Human 
Rights 
1.024 .903 .827 1.066 .917 .961 
Level of 
Democracy 
1.20*** 1.20*** 1.030 1.107** 1.043 1.109** 
Level of Economic 
Development 




.792 .489*** .547** .837 .849 .702 
Common Law or 
Not 
.603 .287*** .576 .412*** .340*** .438*** 
Transitioning 
Democracy or Not 
.389 .296** 1.079 .892 .986 .917 
Level of Aid .132 .042 .178 .023** .096 .405 
Regional 
Ratifications 
13.0*** 7.93*** 5.682** 1.28 6.35*** .647 
# of Countries 74 73 57 69 107 82 
# of Ratifications 57 55 51 65 80 81 
# of Observations 1051 1056 610 491 1003 213 
**significant at .05; ***significant at .01 
 
In fact, state ratification behavior as to these six main 
international human rights treaties appears somewhat 
indiscriminate since the results indicate no factor is consistently 
correlated with ratification.  Of the factors that are significant 
predictors of ratification behavior for more than one of the six main 
treaties, the hazard ratios for the democracy, difficulty of 
ratification process, common law, and regional indicators are in the 
predicted direction.  Democracies are more likely than autocracies 
to quickly ratify each of the ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, and CRC.  
States with more difficult ratification procedures are less likely to 
ratify the ICESCR and CERD.  Common law states are less likely to 
commit to the ICESCR, CEDAW, CAT, and CRC.  Regional 
ratification patterns positively influence ratification of the ICCPR, 
ICESCR, CERD, and CAT.  But, while these various factors did 
influence commitment in some cases, their influence was not in 
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any way uniform across these treaties with the same enforcement 
mechanism.  Only ratification of the ICESCR is significantly 
influenced by all four of these factors. 
In sum, ratification of the main treaties does not seem to be 
influenced by any one factor, and the main compliance cost 
variable—a state’s level of human rights practices—is not a 
significant predictor of ratification behavior in these cases where 
enforcement mechanisms are weakest.  Instead, and as shown in 
Table 4, states with poorer human rights practices seem to be 
readily and regularly joining these treaties with the weakest 
enforcement mechanisms despite the fact that they may be unable 
or unwilling to comply with the treaty’s terms and goals.  But, 
since the treaty’s enforcement mechanisms are too weak to punish 
bad and noncompliant behavior, these “bad” states can join with 
no risk to their sovereignty and as window dressing only.104 
The results of the tests of the treaties grouped in Enforcement 
Level 2 (interstate complaints) also lend support to the credible 
threat theory.  The results reported in Table 7 show that better 
human rights practices did not significantly and positively predict 
state ratification of either Article 41 of the ICCPR or Article 21 of 
the CAT.  In those models, only democracy and regional 
ratifications are significant and then only with respect to 
ratification of CAT Article 21.  Otherwise, none of the other 
indicators are significant predictors of ratification behavior, 
suggesting that state decisions to ratify may not be based on a 
rational costs and benefits analysis when enforcement mechanisms 
are still relatively weak.  Indeed, the treaty terms associated with 
the treaties grouped in Enforcement Level 2 make clear that 
committee power will be limited to trying to negotiate a resolution 
to any interstate complaints.  Moreover, it seems the interstate 
complaint practice is not really used in any event—a fact that states 
ratifying the treaty likely knew when they decided to bind 
themselves to this mechanism.  For example, twenty-six of the 
forty-eight states that have ratified Article 41 of the ICCPR did not 
do so until 1990 or after (even though many could have ratified 
                                                     
104 See Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, supra note 5, at 1378 (noting that 
mechanisms for treaty enforcement are often weak, which encourages ratification 
because states obtain the benefit of having signed onto the treaty while at the 
same time might avoid the consequences of any non-compliant behavior). 
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beginning in 1966)—by which time states likely realized the 
provision for interstate complaints was not being invoked.105 
 
Table 7: Level 2 Enforcement Mechanisms: Interstate Complaints 
 
Explanatory Variables Hazard Ratios 
 Art. 41 ICCPR Art. 21 CAT 
Level of Human Rights 1.042 1.008 
Level of Democracy 1.155 1.170** 
Level of Economic Development 1.245 1.585 
Difficulty of Ratification Process .653 .734 
Common Law or Not 1.632 .473 
Transitioning Democracy or Not .707 1.220 
Level of Aid .789 .120 
Regional Ratifications 14.775 8.368** 
# of Countries 121 129 
# of Ratifications 18 34 
# of Observations 2594 1910 
**significant at .05; ***significant at .01 
 
In short, there is scant evidence that the costs of noncompliance 
drive state decisions to commit to international human rights 
treaties with weak enforcement mechanisms.  The measure for 
human rights practices was not significant in any of the models 
testing state ratification of treaties categorized as having Level 1 
and Level 2 enforcement mechanisms.  Furthermore, the evidence 
shows that democracies were more likely to ratify only some of the 
eight treaties grouped in Levels 1 and 2.  Moreover, other factors 
also influenced treaty ratification in some cases, and in some cases 
those factors predicted ratification in ways that were contrary to 
theory. 
Conversely, where the enforcement mechanisms are strongest, 
the empirical evidence suggests states engage in rational backward 
looking calculations and consider compliance costs and their level 
of human rights practices when making commitment decisions.  As 
Table 8 shows, a state’s level of human rights practices is a highly 
significant predictor of ICC ratification, and states with the worst 
human rights practices are much less likely to join the ICC.  The 
                                                     
105 Thirty-four of the sixty states that have ratified Article 21 of the CAT 
similarly did not do so until 1990 or after.   
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hazard ratio of .523 indicates that states are about 50% less likely to 
join the ICC with each unit decrease in their human rights 
practices.106 The democracy indicator of compliance is also 
significant for ICC treaty ratification, a fact which is consistent with 
the credible threat theory since democracies also tend to follow the 
rule of law, limit government power, and have the types of policies 
and practices enabling them to comply with international human 
rights treaties.  With each unit improvement in its democracy 
rating, a state is about 20% more likely to ratify the ICC.  These 
findings all support the credible threat theory: where enforcement 
mechanisms are strongest, states most able to comply with the ICC 
treaty requirements are also the most likely to ratify.  Those less 
able to comply—namely, those with the worst human rights 
practices and non-democracies—are less likely to ratify. 
 
 Table 8: Level 5 Enforcement Mechanism: Independent 
Prosecutor 
 
Explanatory Variables Hazard Ratios 
 International Criminal Court 
Level of Human Rights .523*** 
Level of Democracy 1.230*** 
Level of Economic Development .743** 
Difficulty of Ratification Process 1.127 
Common Law or Not .939 
Transitioning Democracy or Not .673 
Level of Aid .134 
Regional Ratifications 7.389** 
# of Countries 135 
# of Ratifications 74 
# of Observations 848 
**significant at .05; ***significant at .01 
 
                                                     
106 As a robustness check, I also ran the Level 5 and Level 1 ratification 
models using the Cingranelli-Richards measure for human rights practices.  The 
results similarly showed that states with better human rights practices were 
significantly more likely than states with poor practices to commit to the ICC 
(Level 5).  In the models testing ratification of the human rights treaties with the 
weakest enforcement mechanisms (Level 1), this measure of a state’s human 
rights practices (like the Political Terror scale measure) was not a significant 
predictor of state commitment. 
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Accordingly, these findings regarding ICC commitment lend 
support to the credible threat theory, but at the same time discredit 
the explanatory power of the credible commitment theory and the 
external pressures theories.  In the case of the ICC, where 
enforcement mechanisms are strongest, the evidence does not 
suggest that non-democratic states or states with poor practices are 
more likely to bind themselves to a treaty with which they cannot, 
or will not, comply because they either want to tie their hands to 
act better in the future or because they were pressured to signal 
their commitment to international norms.  As to the credible 
commitment theory in particular, again, one might question why 
an autocratic state that has declined to impose upon itself domestic 
accountability mechanisms would willingly impose upon itself an 
international accountability mechanism that could result in 
government leaders being tried in The Hague.  On the contrary, the 
evidence suggests that, consistent with the credible threat theory, 
states with poor human rights practices and non-democracies—the 
very states that are likely to conclude that compliance with the ICC 
may be difficult and, hence, costly to their sovereignty—will be 
wary of joining the Court and will avoid its strong enforcement 
mechanisms.  And, indeed, one could expect that ICC commitment 
would be most costly for this category of states since commitment 
would entail a reduction of leaders’ power to rule domestically as 
they see fit—even if that means using violence and refusing to 
prosecute themselves or their compatriots who commit violent 
acts. 
Where enforcement mechanisms are in the middle range 
(Enforcement Levels 3 and 4), however, results are mixed.  
Supportive of the credible threat theory are the findings regarding 
commitment to the ICCPR First Optional Protocol.  As shown in 
Table 9, and consistent with Cole’s findings,107 a state’s level of 
human rights practices does significantly and positively predict 
ratification of the ICCPR First Optional Protocol.  In addition, 
another indicator of potential compliance—namely, a state’s level 
                                                     
107 Cole tested the influence of enforcement mechanisms on ratification 
decisions, but only as to the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and the ICCPR First Optional 
Protocol.  He found that a state’s level of human rights ratings did not predict 
ratification of the ICCPR (even as to Article 41 which allows state complaints) or 
of the ICESCR.  However, states with better human rights ratings were more 
likely to join the ICCPR First Optional Protocol—a fact that Cole attributed to the 
differing enforcement mechanisms between the main treaties and the Optional 
Protocol.  See Cole, supra note 21, at 485. 
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of democracy—was also a significant and positive predictor of 
state ratification of the ICCPR First Optional Protocol.  On the 
other hand, a state’s human rights ratings did not predict 
ratification of the other three treaties allowing individual 
complaints.  Instead, the only compliance cost measure that 
significantly predicted ratification of these three treaties was the 
democracy measure.  But, that measure only predicted ratification 
of the CEDAW Optional Protocol. 
 
Table 9: Level 3 Enforcement Mechanisms: Individual 
Complaints 
 











Level of Human Rights .630** .813 1.129 .832 
Level of Democracy 1.212*** 1.156 1.137 1.198*** 
Level of Economic Development .622*** .826 1.335 .815 
Difficulty of Ratification Process .943 1.191 .683 1.064 
Common Law or Not .325*** .236** .217*** .554 
Transitioning Democracy or Not 1.113 .885 1.225 .890 
Level of Aid .056 1.62 .001 .007** 
Regional Ratifications 1.010 17.867** 9.400** 2.828 
# of Countries 102 131 129 138 
# of Ratifications 50 27 35 72 
# of Observations 1862 2766 1922 846 
**significant at .05; ***significant at .01 
 
In addition, as to this individual complaint enforcement 
mechanism, there is some limited support for the explanatory 
power of the normative and external pressures theories.  
Specifically, regional ratification rates positively and significantly 
influenced ratification of CERD Article 14 and CAT Article 22.  
However, the findings on the effect of regional ratifications are not 
consistent across all of the four treaties in this category.  
Furthermore, the other relevant normative and external pressures 
variable—level of aid—is not a significant predictor of ratification 
of any of these treaties.  Thus, on the whole, the empirical evidence 
as to this level of enforcement mechanisms is rather inconclusive. 
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On the other hand, another interpretation of these null results 
as to Enforcement Level 3 is that states do not view the individual 
complaint procedure as a very strong enforcement mechanism.  If 
the individual complaint mechanism poses no credible threat, then 
states can commit without having to concern themselves with their 
ability to comply—meaning that the state’s level of human rights 
ratings need not be figured into the ratification calculation.  After 
all, the committees to whom these individual complaints are 
referred do not have the ability to issue legally binding decisions.  
Their powers are limited to persuading states to adopt their views 
and recommended remedies.  Furthermore, there is evidence that, 
at least with regard to the CERD and the CEDAW, the individual 
complaint procedure mechanism is of little significance in practice.  
Jack Donnelly characterized the procedure for considering 
individual complaints under the CERD as “largely moribund.”  He 
noted that the CEDAW committee had only issued three decisions 
under the individual complaint procedure since it was empowered 
to consider such complaints in 2000.108 
The null findings regarding the CAT Optional Protocol 
(Enforcement Level 4), which are reported in Table 10 below, may 
be explained similarly.  Compliance costs may not influence 
ratification of the CAT Optional Protocol simply because states do 
not view the treaty’s enforcement mechanism as a credible threat.  
Like the other committees, the committee overseeing that treaty is 
not empowered to act punitively or impose any sanctions for 
noncompliance.109  Furthermore, as Henry Steiner notes regarding 
the Human Rights Committee, it is unlikely to pose a great threat 
to states as it thus far is able to consider only a small number of 
communications,110 most of its decisions receive little publicity or 
                                                     
108 DONNELLY, supra note 26, at 87.  Since 2005/6, when Donnelly was writing, 
decisions have continued to trickle out of the CEDAW Committee.  The handful of 
Decisions and Views rendered by the Committee to date is available through the 
United Nations website.  See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women—Jurisprudence, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH 
COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ 
jurisprudence.htm (last visited Nov. 19. 2012). 
109 See Steiner, supra note 31, at 37 (commenting that the ICCPR Committee’s 
views are poor instruments to achieve greater protection of rights by all states due 
in part to the lack of an accompanying enforcement mechanisms). 
110 A 2009 report of the Human Rights Committee indicated that it had issued 
forty-six decisions (and declared twenty-nine cases inadmissible) between 
October 2008 and July 2009.  See Rep. of the Human Rights Comm. Vol. I, 94th 
sess, Oct. 13–31, 2008, 95th sess, Mar. 16–Apr. 3, 2009, 96th sess, July 13–31, 2009, 
iii, U.N. Doc. A/64/40; GAOR, 64th Sess., Supp. No. 40 (2009). 
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attention, and the suggested remedies—compensation, release of a 
prisoner, or changes to legislation—do not likely threaten state 
interests sufficiently.111  Those same issues presumably prevail in 
connection with committees for each of the main international 
human rights treaties and affect how states view the enforcement 
mechanisms associated with treaty ratification. 
 
Table 10: Level 4 Enforcement Mechanism: Committee Visits 
 
Explanatory Variables Hazard Ratios 
 CAT Optional Protocol 
Level of Human Rights .732 
Level of Democracy 1.215 
Level of Economic Development .691 
Difficulty of Ratification Process .832 
Common Law or Not 1.71 
Transitioning Democracy or Not 1.443 
Level of Aid .008 
Regional Ratifications 7.349 
# of Countries 135 
# of Ratifications 30 
# of Observations 600 
**significant at .05; ***significant at .01 
7. CONCLUSION 
The quantitative analysis in this study of the relationship 
between treaty enforcement mechanisms and the likelihood of 
ratification across a broad range of international human rights 
treaties provides evidence that state behavior is influenced by 
compliance costs—but only where enforcement mechanisms are 
strong enough to hold states to their commitments.  The statistical 
analyses offer evidence that states view international human rights 
treaties with stronger enforcement mechanisms as a credible threat.  
I find that states with poor human rights records regularly commit 
to international human rights treaties with the weakest 
enforcement mechanisms.  On the other hand, states with poorer 
records are less likely to commit to the ICC.  The implication is that 
where enforcement mechanisms are stronger, states take their 
commitment to international human rights treaties seriously.  
                                                     
111 Steiner, supra note 31, at 36–37. 
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Thus, it may be that states are committing to treaties with weak 
enforcement mechanisms in an effort to signal their legitimacy, 
without any real intention of bettering their human rights 
practices.  At least some of those states may conclude that the costs 
of commitment are cheap and the consequences of noncompliance 
are meager or nonexistent.  States may commit to the ICC for other 
reasons entirely—because they intend to comply with treaty terms.  
After all, should they fail to comply, states face a substantial risk to 
their sovereignty—state leaders or citizens can be hauled to The 
Hague to stand trial. 
The results further indicate that for enforcement mechanisms to 
pose a credible threat, they must include a formal grant of power 
to engage in legally binding decision-making accompanied by 
resources to coerce compliance.  The empirical tests indicate that 
states do not view any of the enforcement mechanisms in Levels 1 
through 4 as a credible threat.  In none of those cases is a state’s 
level of human rights ratings a consistent, significant, and positive 
predictor of ratification, suggesting that states are not overly 
concerned with compliance costs where enforcement mechanisms 
do not include a grant of power to engage in legally binding 
decision-making.  Only in the case of the ICC treatyis a state’s level 
of human rights practices a significant and positive predictor of 
ratification.  Only that treaty contains an enforcement mechanism 
that allows for legally binding decision-making.  States joining the 
ICC treaty delegate to an independent Prosecutor and to the Court 
the powers to mount investigations, issue arrest warrants, 
commence investigations, and punish persons who commit mass 
atrocities where the state refuses or is unable to do so domestically.  
The evidence suggests that in the case of ICC commitment, states 
are concerned about the costs of the compliance and the relative 
strength of the ICC treaty’s enforcement mechanisms and engage 
in backward-looking calculations about their likelihood of 
compliance prior to commitment. 
I thus argue that another implication of these statistical 
analyses is that treaties with stronger enforcement mechanisms 
have the best chance of actually influencing and changing states’ 
human rights behavior for the better.  Even if fewer states ratify, 
designing treaties so that states focus on the potential for 
compliance with treaty terms makes sense since the point of 
international human rights treaties is to actually promote better 
human rights practices and punish those who abuse human rights.  
If states are committing to international human rights treaties 
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without regard for their ability to comply—something which this 
and other studies112 have shown to occur when enforcement 
mechanisms are weak—the prospects for realizing treaty goals are 
slim.  A brief look at some of the states listed in Table 5 may help 
illustrate this point.  For example, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, 
Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Russia, Syria, and Turkey are 
members of the six main international human rights treaties—some 
for decades.  Yet, these states all continue to have relatively poor 
human rights ratings.  My review of the data shows that the 2008 
political terror scale rating for all of these states is generally well 
below average (on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, with 5 being the 
worst practices).113  This alone provides some proof that allowing 
states—or even encouraging them—to commit to international 
human rights treaties with weak enforcement mechanisms 
incapable of punishing the bad and noncompliant may not be 
sufficient to produce positive change.  In fact, some states with bad 
records may be using the fact that they ratified these treaties as 
something of a shield for their bad behavior: they can point to their 
membership in an effort to avoid scrutiny of their actual domestic 
practices.114 
This study has looked at the role treaty terms can play in states’ 
ex ante beliefs about the institution and the role that the existence of 
apparently stronger enforcement mechanisms can play in 
screening states at the ratification stage.  Future research should 
look at the actual impact of those stronger enforcement 
mechanisms and the role they play in improving compliance with 
treaty terms.  For example, with the ICC treaty and its stronger 
enforcement mechanism, researchers can look for evidence that 
states have changed their laws to provide for the punishment of 
those who commit mass atrocities; evidence that states have 
improved their military training and practices so that they do not 
                                                     
112 See Wotipka & Tsutsui, supra note 22, at 744–47 (noting that results of 
event history analyses concerning state ratification of seven international human 
rights treaties—all of which contained only reporting enforcement mechanisms—
showed that “rights-violating governments are more likely to ratify human rights 
treaties in a given year, all else being equal.”). 
113 The ratings for 2008 are as follows: Egypt (3.5); Ethiopia (3.5); Indonesia 
(3.5); Israel (5); Lebanon (3); Libya (3); Morocco (3); Russia (4); Syria (4); and 
Turkey (3.5). 
114 See Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, supra note 5, at 1374 (observing that while 
the average state ratified an increasing percentage of available human rights 
treaties, the percentage of states reported to repress human rights has likewise 
increased).   
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run afoul of the treaty’s war crimes provisions; and evidence that 
states are domestically prosecuting crimes otherwise within the 
ICC’s jurisdiction so as to avoid any loss of sovereignty. 
Future research should also look beyond treaty terms and 
examine how the actual functioning of the institutions responsible 
for monitoring and/or enforcing compliance with the terms and 
goals of international human rights treaties influences state 
commitment and compliance.  If the institutions in charge of 
enforcing compliance are weak or ineffective, we may see that even 
where enforcement mechanisms are strong on paper, states will 
view the actual enforcement mechanisms as weak and commit 
without an intention to comply with treaty terms.  On the other 
hand, if institutions are effective and if states see that the 
institution is effectively punishing noncompliant behavior, states 
should have even more reason to view strong enforcement 
mechanisms as a credible threat and behave accordingly.  Indeed, 
if future research does show that states respond to the credible 
threat of strong enforcement mechanisms and alter their behavior 
so as to comply with those enforcement mechanisms, at least some 
international human rights treaties may actually realize their goals 
of improving human rights practices and ensuring that those who 
do abuse individual human rights are punished. 
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APPENDIX A 
States Parties to the 14 Different Treaties, Articles, and/or 
Protocols 
 
ICCPR (166 State Parties):  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, 
Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, North Korea, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, 
France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, 
Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, 
Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, 
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South 
Korea, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi 
Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, 
Tajikistan, Thailand, Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom, Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, 
Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Article 41 (48 State Parties):  Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, 
Congo, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Gambia, 
Germany, Ghana, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, South Korea, Russia, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine, 
United Kingdom, United States, Zimbabwe. 
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Optional Protocol (115 State Parties):  Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, 
Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Barbados, Belarus, 
Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, 
Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, 
Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Moldova, Romania, Russia, 
San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname, Sweden, Tajikistan, Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago 
(denounced 2000), Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, 
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Zambia. 
 
ICESCR (160 State Parties):  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, 
Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, East Timor, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, 
France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, 
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, 
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland , Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, 
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, Laos, 
Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, 
Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia,  Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Norway,  Pakistan, Panama, 
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Republic of Congo, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, San Marino, Senegal, 
Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon 
Islands, Somalia, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Vincent and the 
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Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, 
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay, 
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
CERD (173 State Parties):  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, 
Antigua, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, 
Bosnia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
East Timor, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, 
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq , Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory 
Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, 
Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, 
Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia,  Nepal, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman,  Pakistan, Panama, 
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, 
Republic of Congo, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, 
Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United 
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, 
Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Article 14 (53 State Parties):  Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Georgia, 
Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, 
Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San 
Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, South 
Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
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CEDAW (185 State Parties):  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, 
Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, 
Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, 
Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, 
Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, 
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, North Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, 
France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, 
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, 
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, 
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, 
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Monaco, Mongolia, 
Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, 
Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, Qatar, South Korea, Moldova, Romania, Russia, 
Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, 
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Tanzania, Uruguay, 
Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe. 
Optional Protocol (98 State Parties):  Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua 
and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, 
Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, France, 
Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, 
Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, South Korea, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, San Marino, 
Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, 
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Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, 
Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom, Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela. 
 
CAT (147 State Parties):  Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, 
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, 
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, 
Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, 
Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, 
Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, 
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, 
Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, 
Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, South Korea, Moldova, Romania, 
Russia, Rwanda, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, 
Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, 
Tajikistan, Thailand, Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia. 
Article 21 (60 State Parties):  Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, 
Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, 
Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, 
Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, 
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Article 22 (64 State Parties): Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, 
Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, 
Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, 
Portugal, South Korea, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
Optional Protocol (48 State Parties):  Albania, Argentina, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Cambodia, 
Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
France, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Montenegro, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, 
Moldova, Romania, Senegal, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Macedonia, 
Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay. 
 
CRC (193 State Parties): Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, 
Antigua, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, 
Bolivia, Bosnia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Cook Islands, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, East Timor, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, 
Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, 
Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland , Israel, 
Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan , Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, 
Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, 
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Norway, Oman, 
Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Congo, Romania, 
Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi 
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Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South 
Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Sudan , Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, 
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab 
Emirates, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, 
Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
ICC (111 State Parties): Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, 
Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, East Timor, Ecuador, 
Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, 
Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Marshall 
Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Namibia, Nauru, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Romania, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. 
Vincent & the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra 
Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United 
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APPENDIX B 
CONTROL VARIABLES DATA DESCRIPTION 
Democracy: The democracy indicator is a time-varying 
measure coded on a 0 to 10 scale, with scores based on several 
dimensions of democracy: (1) competitiveness of political 
participation; (2) openness and competitiveness of executive 
recruitment; and (3) constraints on the chief executive.  See Monty 
G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr & Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Project: 
Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2009, CTR. FOR 
SYSTEMIC PEACE (Apr. 30, 2010), available at  
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2009.pdf. 
 
GDP Per Capita: I obtain the GDP per capita measure for the 
“level of economic development” variable from the World Bank 
World Development Indicators dataset.  I also log the measure to 
reduce a skewed distribution.  This measure indicates the level of a 
state’s wealth and is correlated with its level of industrialization.  
This is a time-varying measure that is reported in constant U.S. 
dollars.  See Data: United States, THE WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2012). 
 
Difficulty of Domestic Treaty Ratification Process: The 
Simmons data used to measure this concept of codes describes 
ratification processes using a four-category scale designed to 
capture the level of difficulty in the formal domestic ratification 
process.  The categories are as follows: (1) treaties may be ratified 
by an individual chief executive or cabinet; (1.5) there is a rule or 
tradition of informing the legislature of signed treaties; (2) treaties 
may only be ratified upon consent of one legislative body; (3) 
treaties may only be ratified by a supermajority vote in one 
legislative body or by a majority vote in two separate legislative 
bodies; (4) treaties may be ratified through national plebiscite.  The 
source and detailed description of this data are available on 
Simmons’ website.  See BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS app. 3.2 (2009), 
available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/bsimmons/files/APP_ 
3.2_Ratification_rules.pdf. 
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Common Law State or Not: I measure whether a state follows 
a common law tradition or not using a dichotomous variable.  I 
obtained the data for this variable from the Global Network 
Growth Database created by William Easterly.  See William R. 
Easterly, Global Development Network Growth Database, THE WORLD 




Transitioning Democracy or Not: I use a dichotomous variable 
to measure whether a state is a newly transitioning democracy or 
not based on the Polity IV democracy variable.  Following 
Simmons, who used 7 as the number above which she considered 
countries to have transitioned to “democracy” in her work testing 
state commitment to and compliance with various international 
human rights treaties, I code states as a 1 and as new democracies 
in a given year if they transitioned from anywhere below a 7 on the 
Polity IV scale to a 7 or above.  See SIMMONS, supra note 22, at 385.  
If states were consistently above 7 for the Post-World War II 
period, I consider them to be stable democracies and code them 0.  
If states are consistently below a 7, I consider them non-
democracies and also code them 0. 
 
Official Development Assistance: I obtain the time-varying 
ODA data to measure the idea that states may be pressured to join 
international human rights treaties so as to obtain extra-treaty 
benefits like aid from the World Bank World Development 
Indicators.  The data are reported in constant 2007 U.S. dollars as a 
share of GDP.  See Data: United States, THE WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2012). 
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